NEW TIMES

February 1992

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

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A RUSSIAN WEEKLY

NEW TIMES

No. 9, 1992
Founded 1945

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

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From our mailbag

● Don't think I want to flatter you. I can say, however, that the rubric "Manuscripts do not burn" is a sort of university which enriches the reader much more than "universities of Marxism-Leninism" or "party higher schools" did.

Here is an example to illustrate my point. During the years of glasnost not a single newspaper or magazine could give a name to the revolution engendered by *perestroika*. After the abortive coup last August timid attempts were made to call it "tender", "ashberry" and even "revolution with a Rostropovich face".

In July 1991 *New Times* carried Pyotr Struve's article "Revolution and Counterrevolution" which convincingly shows that the bourgeois revolution in the first decade of our century was "canned" by the revolution in October 1917. The author predicted that the "socialist intoxication" would pass and the bourgeois revolution would continue; and it continues.

An equally prophetic conclusion about our future was drawn by Alexander Lyubishchev in his article "Hungarian Tragedy". In 1956 he described the events in Hungary as "the first terrible blow at Stalinism". There were indeed prophets in our country. At the initial stage of *perestroika* Mikhail Gorbachev persistently insisted on developing the theory of *perestroika*. I think that he simply did not know about Struve or Lyubishchev.

I hope very much that all the articles published under the rubric "Manuscripts do not burn" will be put out in a separate book and that, as a subscriber to *New Times*, I shall have a priority right to buy it.

Anatoly Karpus, neuropathologist
Ryazan

■ I always read your magazine with interest, the People section in particular. Once it also carried an item about me. However, Zolotussky, a critic, was more lucky. In issue 6/92 an item about him was placed before an item about Brigitte Bardot. The famous actress was the first to have posed in the nude before a camera. The nearness of his photograph with that of this charming woman evidently affected the critic so much that he decided to follow her example and also appear in the nude, not before a camera but before the readers. Zolotussky revealed that he wanted to become a literary chief. However, wicked people stood in his way. On reading this complaint I understood once again that not every soul should be exposed. It is not always a beautiful sight. Brigitte Bardot is certainly more beautiful in all her poses.

G.Baklanov

■ I did not like your coverage of the events in the Persian Gulf. It was one-sided and tendentious. You are not right in your frantic hatred towards Iraq. This is evident by the press reports. A girl who told the world about the Iraqi brutalities in the maternity homes of Kuwait proved to be a daughter of the Kuwaiti Ambassador in the United States. During the occupation she was far away from Kuwait. However, this did not prevent US Congressmen from demanding armed interference on the basis of her evidence.

For some reason you keep silent about the brutalities committed by Israeli troops in the occupied Arab territories. In short, I do not like many things in your magazine. However, I read it from cover to cover in the hope of finding something good. At last, such an article appeared. I have in mind an interview with Alexander Rutskoi "The President says hello to me" (No. 1/92). Rutskoi, if you like, personifies all the peoples of Russia. His thoughts are clear to Russians, Evenks, Ossets and Khakasses, because they are permeated with concern for the ordinary man.

R.Salmanov
Syzran

■ I read Irina Lagunina's article "Stuck in the jungle" (No. 49/91). A am a citizen of Vietnam, but not a Communist, and I think very badly of communism. But I believe that the United States committed aggression against Vietnam and suffered a complete defeat.

I think you will not be pleased to hear someone claiming that the Nazis were defeated near Moscow thanks not only to the courage of your people but also because the capital was also defended by a million British and American soldiers. I am also displeased to hear statements (like the one made by your author) that Hanoi was defended by thousands of Chinese soldiers and that 4,000 of them died.

Is it so? Hanoi is the capital of North Vietnam, and American troops fought in the south. Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities in the north were only subjected to bombing. It appears that China ensured the anti-aircraft defence of Hanoi. However, modern US bombers could be shot down only by Soviet missiles. The Soviet Union did not supply modern weapons to the Chinese. Soviet soldiers never fought in Vietnam. It is a well known fact. Your military advisers were indeed in our country. Some of them took part in fighting. However, no more than ten of them were killed in action.

The bourgeois evolution ontinues"

Though I am ietnamese, am not a ommunist"

This article, just as many hers, reveals ill-will towards etnam. This can be under- ood, for our leadership is ommunist. But don't hurry ith conclusions. We began erestroika after you, in 1986. ne Soviet Union was then a uperpower and Vietnam one f the poorest countries in the orld. But today we live better an you in many respects. Of ourse, we shall all end up with apitalism. However, the roads capitalism are different.

Le Van Tien

■ Perhaps I would never rite you were it not for Mokeyev's letter (No. 1/92). ke Mokeyev, I do not mind the ugged" language used in ur magazine. However, it oes not befit your fine agazine to use slang. Do you ink that the prestige of *New imes* can be enhanced by the orrible expressions used by Roslyakov in his article "How was free." Of course, every uthor wants to make a brilliant splay of his "eloquence". But t him do that at his own ex- ense.

V. Miroshnichenko
Saransk

■ I was surprised by eltsin's statement that an au- nomous region of Germans an be established only in a ace where they constitute no ss than 90 percent of the opulation. In fact, it is a refusal rehabilitate the Germans ho lived in the Volga area. eltsin's decision can become dangerous precedent capa- e of stirring up the people in the numerous autonomous regions and republics of the Russian Federation, in which the percentage of the indigenous population is lower. The exodus of Germans to Germany will increase and our country will lose thousands of experienced workers so needed in our time.

Y. Gaiduk
Kharkov

■ I wish the behests of Ron Hubbard (see Mlechin's articles in Nos 47-49/91) came true not only in Russia but also in Latvia. How to enhance the dignity of Russians, how to live in entirely new conditions when the old ideals have been discarded and no one has proposed new ones? How to live further if there is no civilian concord and respect for the law and traditions? I have long thought about all this and have even formed a Russian club. However, things are going slowly because of the lack of a premise and means.

The main thing today is to revive the family. We live in a foreign land. However, our children will regard it as their own. The Creator has determined so. An ordinary man cannot choose his homeland or nationality. I consider myself a Russian woman, with Chinese looks and a Lettish surname. My daughter and grandchildren consider themselves Letts.

However, my four-year-old grandson recently told me: "Granny, you and your relatives are good but the rest of Russians are bad." How to bring up our children normal people if the entire atmosphere makes them think this way? How, in general, to help the unfortunate people? It is impossible to send everyone to a psychiatrist and to buy Hubbard's books. Where to find an instructor or methods which could help the unemployed and humble people? In short, how to start to work and change ourselves so that we, like Americans, will think in the right direction? There is a lot of questions. But how to answer them?

L. Baltgalve
Jurmala, Latvia

■ Russians fear that Baltians will organize a "long knives night". What can be said in connection to this? Everyone judges other people according to their qualities. We heard similar speeches at a meeting of the Latvian parliament devoted to citizenship. Russians did not say: take us into your state. No, they continued to shout that everything in this country belongs to them, that their tanks are still here, and Russia is near, and that they will teach Letts a lesson. This is only a fraction of the scathing remarks uttered.

We Letts are naive people. We hate the occupying army and simultaneously feel pity for Russian officers. We see there is no greater misfortune for them than return to their beloved Russia. No one is expecting them in their country because they are not wanted there.

Officers do not sit idle but take action, urgently divorcing their wives. They will apparently become robbers while the wives will guard their flats and shout for the world to hear how their rights are flouted, and will call for tanks to protect them.

You should not deride Zhirinovsky (a Russian ultra-patriot). He says what other Russians thinks.

Zigrida Krucenok
Liepaja, Latvia

Compiled by
Tatiana Chernova

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

POLITICAL LIFE

Still strongest?

Marina Shakina

A year ago, Soviet Army Day was marked by a thousands-strong rally of the military in Manezh Square. It did not evoke any sympathy from democrats as on the heels of the Vilnius tragedy men in uniform could generate only dislike and fear. The soldiers arrived in army buses and trucks. Nobody wanted to know what they really thought deep down, as they were simply obeying orders.

Now the Russian Federation President and Vice-President, as well as ex-President Gorbachev attended the meeting marking Fatherland Defender Day, while Democrat old-timer, Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov remarked that while there was an army Russia would continue to exist. What indeed happened over the past twelve months to so greatly modify the attitude to the man with the gun?

Hysteria

When the Soviet Union cracked up, its Army hung suspended in mid-air, as it were. In many republics it is called an "occupation force" and is manifestly seen as Russian. Russia's democratic leaders who inherited the former Union's rights in practically every aspect of government, have suddenly realized that the Army is kin, that really none else could take it under their wing. Of course, that called a different tune, for after all, it is not customary to let kith and kin down.

Democrats have discovered that now and again what they say and what they actually do are poles apart, that at times in politics they are obliged to constrain themselves and seek the objective by tortuous means. The past year has enhanced the stand of the state-minded in the democratic camp. As will be realized, the Army, like history, national sacred cows and tradition comprises one of the pillars of statehood. Hence the current attitude to the Army is rather political than emotional.

It is not so much that the Army, as many think, is now an independent political factor. Indeed, it is disunited, muddled by the multitude of oaths and muzzled by social problems, is politically heterogeneous and has no backbone in the shape of a military concept. Nor do its men all have the same notion of what is taking place in the country or how this should be qualified. Hence, should a new putsch occur, it may be naught but anarchic hysteria, not a purposeful political act with a distinctly defined objective. In the effort to fortify Russia's statehood our leaders have come to realize that they should not undercut its roots.

Russia's democratic leadership says it will not leave the Army in the lurch, even though Russia still has no army of her own...



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

Double hostage

In the upshot, some dozen policemen were battered in Moscow, while in Stepanakert-Hankendi, the Karabakh capital, ten Internal Forces men were seriously wounded and another killed outright. This time the Grad (Hail) mortar shelling Stepanakert from Shusha was targeted not at the peaceful population, as it usually is, but at the Army regiment stationed there, that they directly tasted of the "fruits" of the perennial bumbling around the Karabakh conflict.

Today this Internal Forces regiment is hostage to both belligerents. Baku asserts it is aiding the Armenian gunmen, and hence demands that it pull out. Marshal Shaposhnikov says that the regiment is neutral, is not involved in hostilities and that its withdrawal is obstructed by the local population who are afraid that otherwise they will be utterly defenceless. Finally, Yerevan is convinced that the Army is helping Azerbaijan by providing it with weapons, including the Grad installation which international conventions have banned as a weapon of mass destruction.

How come Azerbaijan has this Grad weapon, which it uses to whelm women and children and the Army, which is supposed to have provided Azerbaijan with this weapon? People in the know believe that the Army is, in hugger-mugger, supplying or leasing arms and other equipment to both sides. Indeed, it allegedly demands 5,000 rubles in payment to hire out one armoured vehicle for a night's "work."

The Karabakh issue represents a priority in foreign policy and in the military sense for the upcoming Rus-

The Manezh "celebrations," with hard-line backers of a unitarian state steeling themselves in grapples with the police.

sian defence ministry which, despite Russia's having no army, is being energetically organized in Moscow. Named among likely ministerial candidates are General Kobetz and Marshal Shaposhnikov, as well as civilian Galina Starovoitova. From what some Russian leaders say, we feel the new minister will sooner be a civilian. Galina Starovoitova herself says that a group of high-ranking military have been plumping her for candidacy and that though she does not hanker for the office, she thinks she would be obliged to accept should the President offer it. She also believes that thus far neither the public nor the Army are prepared to take "a skirt" for chief.

Another likely civilian candidate, allegedly the more probable choice, is the noted armaments expert, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Andrei Kokoshin.

Bullish

President Yeltsin has stated that of all the republics Russia would be the last to establish her own army. There is no question now that she will nevertheless have such an army, as preparations thereto are in full swing. Thus, the President has issued a decree on social services for army personnel. Moscow Vice-Mayor Yuri Luzhkov has announced a special housing programme for servicemen, while the Live Ring association of Russian White House defenders has also moved to build housing for armymen. One thinks that by now all are involved in the bullish play over army "quotations."

In short, the military may now command sky-high price when choosing from what Ukraine, Russia and Azerbaijan promise for instance. If there are enough ethnic Ukrainians among officers having taken the oath of allegiance to Kiev, to staff Ukrainian army cadres, Azerbaijan may find itself short. Currently the republics are squabbling for arms and other equipment that are deployed in their respective territories. But won't we soon see them squabbling for every officer?

Of all former Union republics only Russia and Ukraine will have adequate officer cadres. Indeed, Ukraine has 33 of the nearly 200 officer training schools graduating officers for all the services. All it lacks is the Academy of the General Staff, which trains higher ranks. Where will the respective officer cadres for the other republics be trained, then? In Russia, due not only to language and currency matters, but also to the circumstance that the armaments the republics need will be primarily of Russian make. In his February 23 TV interview, Gennady Burbulis observed in his characteristic enigmatic way that Russia already has an army.

Thorough preparations were made for the February 23 celebrations with a high-ranking policeman issuing the warning on television the day before that the police would not allow unsanctioned meetings in downtown Moscow. This time the police resolved to be tough, one would think for no particular reason. Indeed, the several thousand vociferous conservative hard liners would have not caught the public eye so much so had not the thousands of policemen cordoned off Manezh Square. This show of force provoked an aggressive response. As a result, some ten battered policemen had to be hospitalized. Meanwhile war vets, who had flocked to the Alexander Gardens to pay tribute at the Eternal Flame could not get to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier because of the meetings and police cordons.

Time to get it in the neck

Vitaly Ganyushkin

Even our redoubtable police still do not know how many of them crowded into downtown Moscow. They themselves called out some 10,000 as after all said and done it had been initially alleged that the demonstration would be most formidable, totalling some 400,000. However, only some 15,000 turned up – again a tentative estimate. However, these 15,000 were of different stuff prepared to shed Heaven knows how much blood in grappling with the devilish riot troops who had sought to contain the infuriated mob within the routes the legitimate authorities had endorsed.

No doubt many had turned up out of sincere grief for kith and kin doomed not to return from all those fields of Soviet martial glory. But I think these people, who found themselves involved in the Moscow march to the Eternal Flame, must have felt hot under the collar amongst the vociferous chauvinistic politicos, who enveloped Army Day, which millions of former Soviet citizens still hold so close to heart, in the hysteria of an insatiable hankering for that bygone Party and Soviet empire, wherein sundry half-literate but impudent louts had had it so good, for that guaranteed slice of sausage personifying the Soviet citizen's sure future, and for that good old enemy so dear to heart as both Party and government.

Yes, you got it right. I mean the good old enemy, as for the overwhelming majority, that is for the Bolsheviks, who derive their name from the Russian for majority, in this yelling assemblage who could scarcely demonstrate either sincere grief or sincere patriotism, this was a march whereby enthusiasts sought not to commemorate the fallen, but to seek out the enemy. This was a hysterical marathon all to detect the enemy if not at home then abroad, merely to have him, merely to have the threatening fist, merely to somehow back up our indestructible pugnacious defence potential. Without that craved-for enemy the entire rally in its beaver head gear, the astrakhan tall hats that generals and colonels wear, and the caps that the declasse prefer, suffer from deeply-echeloned socio-political discomfort, afflicted as if lacking vitamins or minerals from the Mendeleev Table of Elements.

To detect that good old enemy and exhort the populace against this enemy would serve to regain stature. His presence would imply a mighty united power, wherein all could be muzzled. The good old enemy would spell a united, integrated armed force, naught else. The good old enemy would imply the ruling party at the helm which in turn would furnish sinecures,

special rations, chauffered limousines, and private villas. Actually it would mean life and what a life at that!

In a nutshell this was a march to regain the life lost, to recover that personalized communism, to reinstitute power over the hoi polloi, whether soldiers, factory workers or simply subordinates.

Currently, for the time being, it is not so important how to identify this good old enemy. Of course, it would be best to re-acquire him in the form of time-honoured international imperialism. But for some reason of late, this international imperialism does not seem to be doing much to provoke a stronger defence capacity and combat potential. On the contrary, it seems desirous of suborning us by means of that slice of sausage. Hence they are compelled to identify as this good old enemy their own home-grown democrats, who have shattered the country and are now trying to shatter that holiest of holies, the armed forces themselves! The only trouble is that there are now so many of these democrats, as many as there are rats in a dilapidated warehouse, with the entire populace or at least half of them taking their side. But that good old enemy must certainly lurk somewhere, after all the hands simply itch.

Incidentally, that good old enemy may also be a war of sorts. Well, not a global one at once, but something akin to the Afghan war. Which would spell a larger number of generals and marshals, and hence a larger number of sinecures, plus a larger number of tanks or warheads than all the other countries taken together have and hence a larger work force in the war industry with a larger number of overseers. Whether we win or not is open to question, but on the other hand, look how many people would be busy. While when the campaign is over, whatever the outcome, the memory of the people could be mobilized for centuries to come, as after all the very soul must work.

Surely, this implies that what we face is the worst type of profanation, the sacreligious manipulation of human sentiment and memory. With this new tear-jerking hope of reanimating the so recent "socialist way of life," over which the parties concerned lick their chops, these self-same parties still earnestly count on "popular support." Who knows but tomorrow they might recruit not thousands but millions duped by the tempting aroma of a sure-to-be-had communist slice of sausage. Isn't it high time to repulse that? Not only by word of mouth, but by action, primarily by means of that self-same slice of sausage, but sausage with a democratic flavour.

Meanwhile it seems to me that these self-same democratic authorities of ours gave too much credit to the sponsors of the "defence march" with their clumsy 10,000 police against 15,000 chauvinists! Thereby they only rendered tangible moral support, with Alksnis exclaiming "There, you see what this democracy is!" Couldn't they have been cleverer and more democratic, as after all it was not only those "commie bastards," as Lenin, as a matter of fact, once called them, who demonstrated in Moscow?

There comes to mind a book in which I happened to read about the mentality of different nations but presented in a sarcastic vein. About us the book said: "Those Russian dopes shout: 'Time to get it in the neck!'"

Might we be not that dopey?

Have we to take Kazan?

Advocates of an independent Tatarstan zealously tear down Russian flags. Meanwhile Moscow supporters hang out these flags everywhere they can. Surely there is some other way of clarifying interethnic relationships

In textbooks according to which our schoolchildren, including those of Tatar stock are still taught, Russia's history up to the 15th century is presented as one incessant struggle against the "Tatar invasion" and subsequently the "Tatar yoke." The taking of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible is glorified as continued self-defence against that "yoke." But if we want the different ethnic units to live in peace and friendship, we must certainly stop teaching Tatars or their Russian neighbours in that fashion. Neither will attempts to re-tell history and call the Russians a savage occupation force who destroyed Kazan make for a gentler relationship.

Digestible sovereignty

The notion of Tataria's secession from the Russian Federation has been intensively debated ever since Yeltsin assumed office as Chairman of Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet with the Russian-Union confrontation setting the tune for the country's political life over the next 18 months. At that time Tatar leaders like their colleagues in the other autonomous republics declared that they wanted to remain in the Union, not Russia. Then the autonomous republics served the Union Centre as a leverage to keep Russia within the fold. However, in 1990 the nationalistic Ittifak movement under Fainuza Bairamova called for Tatarstan's full independent statehood and demonstrated an anti-communist stance, though the then "official nationalism" loyally adhered to the communist ideal.

President Shaimiyev won the elections with his call for "sovereignty." During that summer but prior to the putsch, nobody except the Ittifakers invested this notion with the idea of total independent statehood. As a result, not only Tatars but also many Russians willingly voted for their republic's enhanced status.

However today, when the Union is gone, the situation has completely changed.

For Tatar nationalists, regardless of which organization they may belong to, self-determined statehood is crucial, from which they cannot step down. The idea of a republican referendum is repudiated not only by the national radicals but even by the moderates, implying those prepared to accept the gradual phased attainment of independent statehood.

On the other hand, the attitude to national statehood amongst Russia's Tatar diaspora varies. Some believe their rights, whether of a personal order or related to national culture will be ensured by the existence of an independent Tatar state. Others fear they may find themselves hostage especially if the rights of the non-indigenous ethnic units in Tatarstan are encroached upon.

In Kazan the writer Rafael Mustafin, an erudite intellectual, told me:

"Inasmuch as resident in the republic are only a quarter of all Tatars, the concept of self-determined statehood appears the least happy form of national self-expression. Even before 1917 the Tatar national idea had primarily stressed national cultural autonomy. However, the past seventy odd years have accustomed the public to believing that a national state is essential for a nation's full development. It will evidently be necessary to establish some kind of sovereignty, as otherwise we shall be eroding national Tatar self-awareness.

"I think the republican leadership's decision to hold a referendum next month will not allay passions, but on the contrary, only intensify the cleavage and aggravate the political situation. Hence more appropriate would be a consensus not subordination of the minority to the majority.

"However, can such a consensus be secured? Oddly enough I think it can. Recall Yeltsin's motto which subsequently was so often vilified. He said we should take as much sovereignty as we could digest. However great one's appetite, the belly can take so much and no more. So even if the national extremists take over in Tatarstan, they will still be obliged to secure Russia's acknowledgement.

"Until a state is acknowledged it does not exist. Today, considering its geopolitical situation, demographic composition and history as a state, we cannot expect Tatarstan to be acknowledged by a world community over the foreseeable future. We shall inevitably have to negotiate with Russia. Only such negotiation can produce real sovereignty whatever is announced, whatever the name, coat-of-arms or flag proposed.

Russia will need to count with Tatar national and religious sentiment

"Allusions to Russia's 'tax screw' are induced to economically substantiate the slogan of independent statehood. Yet should Tatarstan refuse to pay taxes, it will immediately be obliged to negotiate fiscal relations with Russia, inasmuch as the interconnection is too great. In that case the upshot need not necessarily be in Tatarstan's favour."

The unwelcome Travkin

Several dozen hooligans, otherwise "national extremists," barred the way to the University library which had been selected by agreement with the City Council as venue for the Congress of the Democratic Forces of Russia. No one was admitted while several were even beaten up. All attempts to negotiate got nowhere. Subsequently these same thugs congregated around the hotel and in the lobby, true already without scuffles.

What the mob resembled most was a rally of a Pamyat-like crowd. Indeed, the same untidiness, the same crazed eyes and for the most part toothless mouths and the same confused mutterings. "There," said one, "Allah knows that I was born in this land. I will not move from this spot because I stand on this my land, but all you want to do is to turn us into a province." Another exclaimed: "Hitler did the right thing. It was the communists who slandered him."

"Why do you think we're against Tatarstan's statehood? We came to find a civilized way of achieving sovereignty." "Well, say what you like, but in fact you want to take away our statehood and our land." "Whom do you mean by all of us?" "Well, all you Russians. Oh, so you're not Russian? Then all you Jews. It's only the Russians you can fool, as we can smell you out from a mile away..." Which is just one more common trait shared with the Pamyat outfit, the presumption of evil desire. This was a hairy mob of semi-underworld types totally devoid of national features despite their "ultra-nationalist" fervour, with them reeking even of vodka, which clearly did not fit in with the traditional type of the sober prudent Tatar.

In the final analysis, it was not so much the Congress that mattered. Simply what it evoked served to unveil the otherwise hidden confrontation.

In Kazan the local chapter of the Democratic Party of Russia, to wit Travkin's Party, took the initiative in sponsoring the Congress. This Party, along with its Kazan locals, have long been dead set against Tatarstan's self-determination as an independent state.

Meanwhile the chiefs of the various national movements, of which there are so many, though, with the exception of the Tatar Public Centre, they are small in number and have but little to distinguish between them, declared that they would not allow any congresses to take place in sovereign Tatarstan. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Mukhametshin warned the organizers by letter and word of mouth that they would do better to choose another venue to avoid excesses. Yet, the local Travkinites persuaded the Muscovites to stand firm.

This warning along with police indifference are now taken as tokens of sympathy on the part of the republican leadership for national extremist mottos. But surely this is simply common sense.

Shortly after the library incident, I watched police clumsily trying to apprehend one hooligan who may have been involved in the scuffle, as nobody could say for sure. However, he was immediately freed by friends. The police did not want to be seriously involved, the more so as they did not know whether this was the man they really had to detain. Then, this only served to provoke still greater mudslinging. Is this worth it? Would not this recruit to the side of the national radicals a still greater Tatar following?

Again zombies

The Tatar national intelligentsia, then young and relatively small in number were decimated over the initial decades of Soviet power. The new intelligentsia, that came into being under Soviet government are largely Russified. Meanwhile the Tatars themselves developed an inferiority complex. The intelligentsia are incapable of couching the national idea in a civilized form. Paradoxically enough, the national radicals dislike most not local Russians, but the Russified Tatars who have been nicknamed zombies.

Today the Tatar national idea is vital for all of Russia, let alone the republic. Indeed, the danger lurking in national movements, of which we are so well aware in Russia, derives from aggressiveness of the declasse elements. Hence the aforementioned Tatar Public Centre, in promoting its programme for reviving the Tatar language and the Tatar national school inasmuch as to date only 7 percent of the republic's children attend Tatar schools, does not blind itself to other ethnic cultures. Thus, they plan to promote Udmurt and Chuvash schools, as well as television and sound broadcasting in the languages of the ethnic minorities resident in Tatarstan. This is undoubtedly constructive. So why don't the local Democrats, the Travkinites acknowledge this? I asked one most determined opponent of the Tatar nationalists, herself incidentally a Russified Tatar, whether she did not think the Democrats erred by overlooking the national issue. She said: "Why, we gave no thought to such ugly things, as we were fascinated by the concept of democratic reform itself!"

As I see it, today Tatarstan's crucial issue lies in the national extremists serving as the vehicle for the national idea. No doubt the republic's Russophones have a greater stake in the earliest emergence of a national, even be it nationalistic, movement that would have no resemblance to the Pamyat association.

Galina Kovalskaya
KAZAN-MOSCOW

A new censorship?

Pavel Gutiontov

It can confidently be stated that the new officials have mastered the old methods of treating the press much quicker than they have settled themselves into their new offices. Respected Anatoly Sobchak invited the chief editors of Petersburg newspapers to the mayor's office (in a TV interview he charmingly calls them "MY papers") and reprimanded them in expressions used in old times (I know who stands behind you, who pulls the strings, it is a coordinated campaign). The mayor did not even listen to reasonable objections. If the newspapers of all trends opposed a given decision of the mayor's office, it is evidently very vulnerable to criticism.

Members of the Russian parliament heatedly discuss newspaper comments and make amazing proposals intended, naturally, to silence the ill-intentioned persons as quickly as possible. Ruslan Khasbulatov, the Speaker, suggested that the TV should not show the meeting hall. The public should not see what deputies do while their colleagues address the audience from the rostrum. He considers it an attempt to discredit the deputies.

I can also recall the just published eloquent document – a memo of Victor Ivanenko, head of the Federal Security Agency (former KGB) to Vice-Premier Yegor Gaidar. The memo, dated December 9, 1991, says: "On your instructions the Federal Security Agency of the Russian Federation has investigated the circumstances of circulating by the Russian information agency Novosti of the information asserting that the Russian banks have ceased all payments in cash, except wages."

Having examined the leakage of information and complained about the impudent refusal of journalists to reveal its source, Ivanenko promised the vice-premier to "conduct preventive work among journalists." In this connection the amendment to the Press Law obliging journalists to reveal the source of information, proposed by Prosecutor-General Valentin Stepankov, does not seem impromptu. This danger did not become less real with the appointment of another general, Victor Barannikov, as head of the Federal Security Agency. Barannikov is also known for his harsh statements.

After the announced merger of the Soviet news agency TASS and the Russian information agency Novosti (an action incongruous with tireless promises to demonopolize everything) there arose a natural question: what are the government's priorities? What is more important for it – the economic reform or control over critical remarks, an action or the evaluation of this action in a way agreeable to the government? These are rhetoric questions, and I think I know the answers to them.

We are witnessing a purposeful attack on the press accompanied by attempts – and this is quite evident – to make it official, tame and obedient. One can understand that one enjoys some rights only when attempts are made to deprive one of them. The paradox of relations between the press and the government lies in the truth that it is impossible to win freedom of the speech once and for all. Freedom of speech has to be defended incessantly.

It became clear to everyone long ago in the civilized world, and gradually becomes clear to us now, that the press tends to oppose any government and, in its turn, any government – whatever nice people hold top posts in it – will not like the press. It will try to subdue the press, hold it in leash, compel it to fulfil its commands.

The mortal danger now hangs over the most popular newspapers and magazines, moreover, those of them which made a great contribution to the appearance of a democratic information space on the territory of the former Union. We are told it is a result of the transition to a market economy which journalists have advocated. This is nonsense, because the undisguised dictation of the monopolists has no relation to a market economy.

It would be unpardonable for the government to quarrel with the press

The uncontrolled rise in the prices of paper and printing expenditure, the unceasing ultimatums by the ministry of communications – all this is not a market economy.

The government and the President pointed out more than once that they would not allow the independent press to be strangled. A practical step was taken at last. On February 21 President Yeltsin signed a long-awaited decree on the defence of the press. This document had powerful enemies. Nevertheless, common sense prevailed, in my opinion. Considerable tax privileges are envisaged for periodicals. The decree also envisages state orders for paper and fixed prices for it...

Nevertheless, without trying to be ungrateful, I shall note that the decree will not solve all problems either. It will only give the newspapers a short respite. In the present situation it would be unpardonable, almost suicidal for the government to quarrel with the press. In spite of this our leaders prefer to direct and control the press. They are evidently tempted to set up new bodies for exercising control over it.

The reason for writing this article was a point in the Minsk Declaration on observing the principles of cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Our presidents decided to seek "an unbiassed and balanced coverage by the mass media of socio-political life in the member states of the Commonwealth, as well as a ban on information likely to stir interethnic discord."

It is interesting who will determine the character of newspaper articles and TV broadcasts, what levers will be used in implementing this point, and what measures will be taken against those who violate it.

Without fearing to offend anyone I can say that this is nothing new to us.

The Russian tragedy

Leonid Vasilyev

Is nationalism compatible with democracy in Russia?

Any empire is bound to fall apart sooner or later, its collapse is a logically predetermined stage of a historical cycle, ushering in a new cycle.

The most violent upheaval of all is the downfall of a totalitarian empire which has always been out to prove to its enemies, real and imaginary, its right to exist, and even to reign supreme in the world.

No hint of Marxism

As a phenomenon of the 20th century, totalitarianism has taken shape on the basis of various forms of national socialism, be it Italian, German, Soviet or even, say, Arab (I mean, above all, the regime of Iraq's Hussein, and not only it alone). The Marxist socialist regimes in Russia, China, North Korea and Cuba can be described as the ultimate in totalitarianism.

Although the Marxist variety of socialism has not put a deliberate emphasis on the nationalistic basis of totalitarian power (because this would have run conter to Marxism, theoretically), any of the above-mentioned Marxist countries actually leaned upon it to a much greater extent than on vague socialism as such. In other words, the national socialist basis of the totalitarian regime of the Marxist socialist type was nationalistic, above all.

As a matter of fact, in all the 20th-century totalitarian regimes without exception, socialism was referred to only as long as this was called for by the official doctrine, while nationalism — in its ethnocentric form, for the most part — was overtly or covertly, but quite steadily, fostered in most various forms, chiefly in the form of worshipping the great charismatic leader who embodied the greatness and might of the nation and the state. Each North Korean knows well today how great his country's leader is, and what a privilege it is to live in a county ruled by such a wise leader. The same is true of Cuba and Iraq. If any citizen of those countries voices his doubts about this idol-worshipping, he takes the consequences.

It is not by chance that I have mentioned those countries out of all the others: their leaders symbolize totalitarian power and embody the greatness of the national idea. Notably, the masses retain their faith in the charismatic leader in times of severe trials and are prepared to follow him to the last. This is no paradox, such loyalty is only to be expected: the people are dazzled by the great idea which is steeped in hypertrophied national pride.

The patriotic leader

Stalin's Russia (as, incidentally, Mao's China) thrived largely on the national idea. Formally, Marxism gave priority to the doctrine of the Radiant Future, but the country's post-war generation had little faith in this idea. The great leader himself made no secret of his aspiring after the country's imperial grandeur rather than after the illusory kingdom of communism. Having shed an ocean of blood, the leader carried out his ambition — new Russia did attain the acme of its imperial grandeur. The national patriots could celebrate their victory. And they did, covering their Russian great-power patriotism with the fig leaf of Marxist internationalism.

The great empire's triumph – victory in WWII...

Russian national patriotism was not obtrusive, let alone intolerant. Apart from covert formal anti-Semitism and officially though not quite openly postulated guilt of several ethnic communities banished from their native lands, Russian chauvinism almost did not manifest itself in real socio-cultural and administrative-political practice. At any rate, non-Russian nationalities of the USSR (apart from the above-mentioned communities) did not feel discriminated against, as a rule. On the contrary, in the non-Russian republics, representatives of the indigenous population were expressly given preference over other nationals in promotion, college enrolment, etc.

On top of that, the Russians' standard of living was by no means higher than that of other Soviet peoples, rather on the contrary. But for all that, it was obvious to all that the USSR meant Russia, first and foremost, that the Soviets were chiefly the Russians, and that the threat which emanated from the nuclear missile power and from the all-powerful military-industrial complex the whole nation slaved for was precisely the Russian threat, as it was referred to all over the world.

No national distinctions

In a word, the national-state monster created by Stalin, at the cost of tens of millions of lives sacrificed to it, culminated the historical process of the rise of the Russian Empire in which the good of the state had traditionally taken precedence over the good, and the very life, of its population (let alone individual lives and human rights).

The ethnic differences within the population – Russian-speaking, for the most part – of the totalitarian empire receded far into the background, if not disappeared altogether. Russian Armenians, Russian Tatars, Russian Jews, Russian Ukrainians, let alone Russians proper, were all patriots of great Russia embodied by the totalitarian Stalin's empire.

Let me repeat: this is not at all a matter of the artificially imposed doctrine of Marxist (proletarian) internationalism, or of slogans about the new historical community ("the Soviet nation"). Both were exercises in propaganda by ideologists. As to the ordinary people and the real socio-psychological climate, all the Russian-speaking residents of Russia regarded themselves as Russians, despite the fact that from time to time they had to state their real nationality when filling in application forms and other formal documents.

...and defeat – its inability to give its people normal life

Our people have been indoctrinated in the spirit of this system of values for centuries, and our patriotism has always been, and still is, based on outstanding examples of selfless services to the state. Not so much to Motherland, mind you, as to the totalitarian state which, being a rightful heir to the tradition handed down since the times of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, has fully identified itself with the Motherland. In other words, for those brought up to be national patriots, Motherland and the totalitarian state were identical indivisible notions, and the greatness of Motherland was closely associated with the prosperity of the mighty totalitarian empire, armed to the teeth.

The Russians as a phenomenon

Experts have often noted the peculiarity of the word "Russian" as a description of ethnic identity. We say: a German, a Turk, a Tatar, a Jew, a Chechen, an Armenian, a Chinese (nouns), but we call ourselves Russian (an adjective). This is a matter of historical rather than merely linguistic interest.

To a historian, the Russians are the residents of Russia, above all. In a narrow ethnic sense, they are, of course, Russians as such, i.e. those who live in Russia, are native speakers of the Russian langauge, brought up in the spirit of Russian national culture, traditions and spiritual values.

A direct parallel with the notion of "an American" suggests itself. Whatever their nationalities and religions, origins, skin colour and other cultural and ethnic characteristics, the Americans are brought together by their national patriotic ideas.

There is, however, a big difference between the Russians (or the Russian-speaking community, to use a phrase current today) and the Americans. An American is a monosemantic notion. Everyone living in America, let alone born in America, is an American. This applies to all, including Negroes, Chinese, Latin Americans and representatives of any other races and ethnic groups residing in the United States. All of them are Americans, and each is prepared to shed his blood, if necessary, for his beloved country which he regards, by right, as a symbol of freedom, democracy and human rights. The national patriotic idea and the principles of liberal democracy are indivisible and interconditional in this case.

The Russians are different as a socio-ethnic phenomenon and as a term designating it. These are ethnic Russians (although there are hardly many pure-blooded Russians to be found after the Tatar invasion and numerous contacts with other ethnic groups), part-Russians (I mean half-breeds whose proportion is much larger than one might think at first glance or than can be inferred from statistics, because no record of half-breeds is kept; instead, persons of mixed origin are free to **choose** between their parents' nationalities for census takers' convenience), and russified non-Russians (among whom persons of mixed descent predominate).

Although people of mixed origin clearly predominate among the Americans, too, this makes no difference there at all. In our case, it does, unfortunately. The famous "fifth paragraph" (in application forms, other formal documents) does not only constantly remind us of that, but insistently demands a choice of nationality, i.e. national self-determination.

In America, it's different...

An American may, or may not, choose a nationality for himself – this is his private affair. In our country, national self-determination was obligatory. One was either to call himself Russian, thus chopping all the other ethnic roots off, or to

Members of *Pamyat* society: a distorted notion of the national idea

consider himself non-Russian while remaining a Russian in spirit. This applied, partially at least, to the ethnic provinces. Non-Russians predominated there, and self-identified themselves accordingly.

As a result, totalitarian Russia consisted of three basic ethnic group: those who registered as Russians; those who registered as non-Russians but lived in Russia proper and were actually Russians in every respect; and those (chiefly in compact non-Russian areas, but not only there) who registered, regarded themselves as, and were de facto, non-Russian. The two former groups constituted, numerically, most of the country's population and were amply represented everywhere, ethnic provinces included.

As already mentioned, this created the illusion that the USSR was chiefly Russia, and that Soviets were Russians for the most part. Everything was camouflaged by, and cemented with, propaganda talk about the friendship of the peoples, proletarian internationalism, and the new historial community called "the Soviet nation."

Why are the Russians so badly off?

The weakening of the imperial structure after Stalin manifested itself in several aspects of ethnic self-awareness.

First of all, the non-Russian population of the republics other than the Russian Federation received real opportunities for ethnic consolidation; the Russians and Russian-speakers were the first to sense this.

Second, the repressed peoples made their appearance on the political arena and demanded justice, which could not but foment ethnic unrest in the country as well.

Third, as the underground economy flourished, representatives of certain republics and ethnic groups came to dominate – as closely-knit ethnic clans or even Mafia-like groups. With their substantial means and connections they entered into confrontation with the impoverished Russians in Russia proper; the confrontation did not go unnoticed and gave birth to stable ethnophobic stereotypes.

Although these and similar ethnic processes developed against the overall background of economic and ecological crisis which hit non-Russian republics (particularly those of Central Asia) as badly as they did Russia proper, the Russian tragedy which consisted above all in the catastrophic decline in Russian farming and in the threat of Russia degenerating as a nation, came out to the fore in bold relief. Objectively, this found its expression in the so-called "village prose," in numerous stories and novels by Russia's prominent writers about the crisis in the countryside and the degenerating nation.

The tragedy of the Russians, as quite truthfully depicted by these writers, was obvious to all thinking people concerned about the fate of Russia and the escalating confrontation between Russians and non-Russians in the country. The rise of ethnic tension suggested the conclusion that not all the residents of our country were as badly off as its main nation, the Russians, were. And although many exposes of the atrocities committed in the Stalin period – particularly, the works by Alexander Solzhenitsyn – pointed directly to the root cause of the tragedy, the totalitarian regime, the socio-psychological stereotypes created by national patriotism provoked further ethnic conflicts in the country. One of these stereotypes goes that the reason why Russians are so badly off is that there are too many Russians in the country who live at the Russians' expense and who have Russians at their beck and call.

The eighties were marked by a pre-crisis state, crisis and attempts to save the bankrupt regime by changing and restructuring it somehow. It was only logical and natural that in those extreme conditions all the previous tendencies – negative tendencies, chiefly – came to a head. The Russians became still worse off, the non-Russians also suffered a reverse and, the main thing, the relations between Russians and non-Russians

deteriorated sharply. Against this background, the national idea began to come to the fore gradually but steadily. The Russians are having a hard time. Who is to blame for that? For all their ridiculousness, the accusations brought against a "Jewish freemason conspiracy" are backed by some outstanding Russian intellectuals.

The country's tragedy, which had an equal impact on all the republics, triggered analogous impulses in many of them. The intensified feeling of national inequality has brought forth national separatism and the striving for deliverance from imperial fetters. This striving manifested itself in the form of anti-Russian feelings which could not but have its effect on the relations between Russians and non-Russians.

The Russians' position in non-Russian republics has become part of the overall Russian tragedy. This naturally poured oil on the flames of ethnic strife.

I leave aside conflicts between various non-Russian peoples, such as that between Armenians and Azerbaijanians, the fiercest of them all, although these conflicts have been produced by the same processes. What's more, the clashes between various non-Russian peoples are now extremely violent and even erupt into wars in places, while Russians and non-Russians are not at war anywhere so far, thank God. But for all that, the confrontation between Russians and non-Russians is now clearly coming to the fore, assuming in Russia proper the same old forms of national patriotism which go back to imperial totalitarian traditions.

National patriotism is a grassroots reaction, largely spontaneous but all the more horrible for that, of the humiliated nation, the Russians, to the tragedy that has befallen it. Those who are rallying today, after the collapse of the empire, around the banner of the Russian national idea, are mourning the demise of the state mostly. They traditionally identify the sufferings of the people with the fall of the regime, of Great Russia, the totalitarian monster of yesterday.

(To be concluded)

The contest over the continental shelf is on

The anti-Japanese lobby in Moscow and Sakhalin tries to make the Russian government recall its decision

The Russian government's decision (signed by vice-premier Yegor Gaidar at the end of January) to license a consortium of McDermott, Marathon, and Mitsui Bussan to develop oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf off the Sakhalin Island (for details see *NT* No. 7/92) stirred up public indignation which was only partially reflected in the press. Who actually opposes that decision and why?

A special parliamentary commission was ordered by the First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Sergei Filatov, to see into the matter, a week after the government's decision which had caused the controversy.

An appeal by the Sakhalin regional government and administration was a formal reason for setting up the commission. This reaction was caused by outright disapproval for the governmental decision, publicly expressed by a number of influential people in the Russian political establishment, rather than by special responsiveness to opinions of the Sakhalin Governor Valentin Fyodorov on the part of the Russian White House.

Chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs and Economic Contacts Vladimir Lukin sent Ruslan Khasbulatov a letter requesting to backtrack on the decision.

Vladimir Lukin, whose political career was preceded by a successful academic career (doctorate in history and a job as an expert on problems of the Pacific region, at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations), has come out against monopolization of development of natural resources in the Russian Far East by Japanese companies. He considers the corresponding government's decision to be fundamentally wrong. In his opinion, it would be a wiser alternative to encourage competition between Japanese and Korean companies in that region and give companies of other Asian countries an opportunity to operate in Russia.

Russian authorities are worrying about an undesired spin-off of deepening Japanese involvement in the economy of regions to the east of the Urals. Economists recite Russia's past agreements with Japan, which, as they believe, gave Russia a clear disadvantage: credits for coal mining in Neryungri, and concessions for felling wood and fishing – all dating back to the Brezhnev era – still haven't been repaid.

In the mid-1970s, Moscow "hitched" all the external economic ties of the Soviet Far East onto Japan, for lack of other eligible partners. The USSR was engaged in a bitter ideological feud with continental China and virtually ignored South Korea, while the East Asian countries had only started on their imposing economic climb at that time.

Today, some Russian economists believe that expansion of Japanese capital leads to dangerous monopolization and that Russia should more actively attract Korean and Chinese capital and invite new Asian "dragons" – businessmen from Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Contrary to a Soviet belief of two decades ago, Japan isn't dependent on Russian natural gas and oil. Japanese oil companies have recently set up a joint venture with oil producers in the Persian Gulf and have a contract for an Alaskan gas supply to Japan till the year 2000. The USA Embassy in Tokyo has already warned the Japanese that rejection of American gas would amount to the declaration of an economic war.

Then why did the Japanese companies aspire to win in the competition over Sakhalin licences?

From the six participants in the competition, five were connected with Japanese capital. Mitsui Bussan, the third most important Japanese trading company, was among the top three winners. Its managers in Tokyo don't even try to hide their aim to shoulder European, Australian and other companies out of the competition for Russian oil and gas.

Aspiring for a contract on Sakhalin gas

Sakhalin Governor Valentin Fyodorov seems to be able to get the upper hand in the argument with the Russian government and make the latter heed the interests of the Sakhalin local authorities

Chairman of the parliamentary committee Vladimir Lukin calls upon the Kremlin to provide a stimulus for competition between foreign companies over the right to invest in the economy of the Russian Far East

and oil. Japan plans to ensure a steady supply to last its industries into the third millennium and also, as experts in Moscow believe, to sell some part of it to continental China and Korea, at a profit. Can Russia not do this itself?

Some Russian politicians are gravely concerned about the political impact of the decision by the Russian government which dismissed the reasoning of the Sakhalin authorities. Sakhaliners' displeasure at having their opinion ignored can be sublimated into something more menacing. The population of the Russian Far East is still believed to be comparatively little politically aware, but rather committed to business. However, the Moscow government's unwillingness to take Sakhaliners' opinion into account can deepen separatist aspirations on the island. An idea of a Far-Eastern Republic is gaining popularity, on economic, rather than political considerations.

But such a republic would not only change the political map of Russia but also influence the territorial dispute with Japan. Though officials in Moscow and Tokyo refuse to discuss this subject point blank, Russian politicians fear that the new leaders of the Russian Far East could prove more tractable and less intransigent. The offer of big money in exchange for the territories can prove to be very attractive and irresistible. However, the above is merely an idle speculation by a political scientist.

Anti-Japanese sentiments are already fairly widely spread among representatives of Russia's political establishment and are manifested primarily in dissatisfaction with the Japanese territorial claims. While the world's most developed economies express readiness for full support of Russia and its president, the Japanese government still displays cool detachment and withdrawal, complains the Russian White House and the Kremlin.

Former Vice-Chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers and current state councillor, Mikhail Malei readily admits his disapproval for development of business cooperation with Japan: "I can explain my disapproval. I'm against returning them the islands and even against maintaining whatsoever contacts with the Japanese. They are sitting on the fence instead of supporting Yeltsin's administration. Let them. They will gain nothing."

Thus, the competition over development of the riches of the continental shelf off Sakhalin is two-fold. On the one hand, there must be a reasonable balance of interests between Moscow and Sakhalin, and on the other, between Moscow, Japan and other neighbouring countries, cooperation with which is necessary for Russia.

The political play over the issue ignores the question of who starts extraction of oil and gas and when. The Russian government and the organizers of the competition believe – quite reasonably – that the extraction of oil and gas must be started as early as possible and that this aim cannot be achieved without massive investment of foreign capital. However, the current discussion of the issue is changing the public's vision of the whole situation.

The production of oil has declined, and its export may be stopped altogether even this year. But shall Russia step up its oil production? Export of the presently extracted oil alone could give Russia all the hard currency it needs, provided the oil is sold at $18 a barrel, which is its current world market price. However, the bulk of the oil extracted by Russia today goes to the former USSR republics for merely $1 a barrel, and every additional ton of oil extracted is going to be sold at that puny price necessitated by Russia's latter commitments. So shall Russia step up its efforts to further deplete its natural reserves?

The public opinion on the role of foreign companies has also changed. On the one hand, foreign capital is not easy to attract nowadays. Companies don't feel secure about making sizeable investments here, because they are not offered proper protection by the Russian law. Money invested today can easily be confiscated tomorrow. On the other hand, foreign business entrepreneurs are fully conscious that Russia is second only to the Middle East in terms of a natural reserve of oil.

Nevertheless, many regard cooperation with Western oil companies as a costly affair, because almost half of the oil extracted would have to go to the foreign companies.

There is a certain duality in the position of the Russian oilers as well. They badly need Western technologies for prospecting for and extraction of oil and gas. At the same time they are afraid to lose in competition with skilled and formidable foreign rivals on the Russian market. Certain Russian experts even deny the need for borrowing Western technologies, since domestically produced drilling rigs are not too bad, they argue.

Leonid Mlechin

Prices' liberty vs. equality and fraternity?

Vadim Makarenko

The sharp rise of prices early this year ushered in the most critical stage of the Russian economic reform. People found their living standard immensely lowered overnight, and many barely make ends meet now. Judging from the government's recent pronouncements, that effect was expected. But does the government realize whereto it is taking the nation?

Flattering comparison with Japan

Implied in the liberalization of prices is: the government gives up the reins since it can no longer find financial and material resources necessary to maintain the system of subsidized prices formerly operating in the country's economy. Otherwise, the government should have reintroduced the totalitarian system under which it had fleeced producers to maintain an economy that could help it keep up the "moral and political integrity of the nation."

Having rejected the socialist system, we can't any more count on a return of the former dirt-cheap prices for bread and milk. Liberalization of prices is only the initial step to establishing stable price proportions. The price of hired labour – the chief commodity – should also be freed

"The day of reckoning has come!.." *Drawing by Andrei Bilzho*

By dealing a final blow to the command-style system of administration, Russians destroyed the machinery which had been keeping the former model of social reproduction operating. For several months afterwards, society still functioned thanks to the laws of inertia alone. Now, the government must either find food to feed the nation or allow the people to feed themselves. The latter alternative calls for introduction of legislation similar to that adopted by the majority of the world's countries. Although such legislation cannot guarantee prosperity for the nation right off, it paves the way to it.

This country's current unbalanced system of prices can be clearly seen from a comparison with the situation in Japan. Why Japan, you may ask? Certainly not because it is economically immensely successful. No, even to catch up with Chile is a tall order for us. The reason is that comparing the ruble against the US dollar is often ambiguous, while the yen better suits our purpose to grasp the paradoxes, tendencies, and the meaning of current changes in this country's price system.

This country's commercial, or market, dollar exchange rate is 110 rubles, which is fairly close to the current international exchange rate of 126 yen to one US dollar. This means that in the world market, the purchasing power of the ruble is roughly the same as that of the yen. Because of the importance of foreign trade for modern economies, the national currency exchange rate provides a true basis for the price system operating in the country. All the other proportions in the national price system ultimately root in this exchange rate.

Many of the imported items – household appliances, ready-made clothes and footwear – cost here the same as in Japan. For example, a retail price for a pair of jeans is 1,500-2,000 rubles here, and as many yen in Japan. However, the proximity of tag prices here and Japan virtually ends with imported items. If we see farther out we will discover differences which can explain the meaning of the unbalanced price system which dominates this country's economy.

We think of 80-90 rubles for a kilo of sour cream or 120-150 rubles for a kilo of cream butter as exorbitant prices. But in Japan, a cone of ice costs 80-100 yen.

But since we have embarked on building a system with well-justified and substantiated price proportions, rather than prices arbitrarily established by the state, the price proportions pattern must resemble that in Japan or the USA. If the government does manage to maintain the ruble exchange rate at the 110:1 level, prices in

Russian shops will forever resemble prices in Japan.

Even under the most favourable turn of events, it is unlikely that there will be consumer items costing less than 10 rubles by the end of the year, while prices below 100 rubles will perhaps remain only for a limited number of items.

The aim: to get people's money?

A sharp price growth will extend to practically all home appliances, like fridges, TVs, etc. Apparently, prices for imported goods have reached their proper level on the market and will either remain stable or grow merely by 40-50 percent a year. Normal economies know no price gap between foreign-made and homemade goods, between farm produce and manufactured goods. Neither will there be such a gap in this country, if the policy of the liberalization of the economy is implemented consistently and fully.

In my opinion, the pitfall here is the government's neglect of such an important component as the cost of hired labour. In Japan, the mean monthly salary is 300,000-350,000 yen, while in Russia, 700-1,000 rubles. Keeping in mind proportions existing in the Japanese price pattern, a mean Russian monthly wage can well reach 70,000-100,000 rubles by the end of the year. In other words, wages can double every two months. However, the government's policy aimed at retrieving hundreds of billions of rubles invested in the national economy during the last years by means of taking the money from people can't be productive, because its aim is absurd.

However, neither the Russian government nor its parliament even consider the possibility of a rise of the nominal price of labour. According to the 1992 taxation plan introduced last year, annual incomes upwards of 25,000 rubles are taxable. However, the limit was upped to 300,000, by the end of January. And that was surely not the last correction of the taxes, because the retail prices of major durables have already topped the 10,000-ruble level.

Regretfully, the public somehow fails to realize the essential difference between demands of higher wages and calls for the maintenance of prices for staple commodities at a low level. In fact, the two demands are polar in their meaning. The former is addressed to the management of a factory, plant, department, etc. The most likely answer here is simple: do you indeed earn what you make in the effort you invest? This approach calls for an increase in productivity and prompts personnel cuts as one of the solutions. But this alternative isn't very attractive for many workers, since it ultimately leads to throwing out the system of wage-levelling.

The other demand boils down to maintaining low prices for everyday services and staple commodities. In fact, it means preservation of the socialist way of life, since to meet this demand the state would have a right to distribute public welfare.

The government, as is known, has lifted all restrictions on the level of wages and salaries the rise of which will be contained only by progressive taxation. Consequently, no directives are now preventing enterprises from increasing the employees' wages to the level ensuring the latter at least the pre-January-2 living standards. But there is a problem of state-run organizations' employees expecting to have their salaries and wages on a par with the quickly-rising salaries and wages in non-state organizations. The government must find enough resolution to overcome the deeply-rooted dogmatism in the approach to the issue.

In reality, the country resigned from socialism (however incompletely and perhaps not for good) only this January 2, through liberalization of prices. That step virtually meant the dismissal of socialism as a way of life of the entire society that was present not only in homes of Communist Party functionaries and ranking state bureaucrats in the form of regular Lucullan food parcels, but also in the homes of ordinary Soviets, in the form of

SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY

Prof. Boris Grushin's Vox Populi Poll

People vote for the ruble

What do you think about freedom to buy and sell foreign currency for rubles for th Soviet people?



Those were returns of an opinion poll of 2,000 people of 18 and upwards, around Russia.

Much about the returns is understandable and expectable, for example, that the issue i question gives the least concern to old people, as well as general labourers and rural resi dents (33, 31 and 39 percent of respondents belonging to these groups displayed perfec indifference), or that older people are generally more negative about the idea of free cur reney exchange than younger people (61 percent "in favour" among the youngest age brac ket and 16 percent "in favour" among the oldest age bracket), or that better educate people favour the idea more often than others (52 percent "in favour" among people wit university degrees and only 14 percent "in favour" among people with 7 years of school).

Nevertheless, much was puzzling. For example, why Muscovites (34 percent of respon dents, against 22 percent on the average) and state employees of the managing sector (3 percent) are the greatest opponents of the idea of free currency exchange?

low prices for bread and milk. Incidentally, a more moderate price hike back in the 1960s resulted in the Novocherkassk tragedy.

What is the real price of the chief commodity?

Even now nothing prevents the government and the parliament from introducing payment for higher and specialized secondary education, making the enterprises meet the costs of medical treatment for their employees, disbanding inexpedient Ministries, cutting down the armed forces, levelling taxes on the use of land and the economic infrastructure, and urging more rational and sparing use of the state property and resources. However, all that must be done wisely, which is very seldom the case in this country. It would be foolish and even dangerous to announce, for example, that in the nearest future university or college education will cost the students a five- or six-digit sum. A wise approach, instead, would call for introduction – in response to the students' just demands of higher scholarships and grants – of state credits to pay for education. A students should be offered loans at an interest which is only slightly higher than that paid by the savings banks to their clients. That interest rate should vary with the subject the student is majoring in, and be nil in case of subjects taken up by future specialists in fields which are particularly socially important. The system of paid higher education should be phased in, and the transition must extend over 4-5 years. This would fall in with the plan of transition towards paying the major part of the earned money to the worker, as a wage or salary, rather than channelling it into public funds.

Inability or unwillingness on the part of intermediate-level managers (in whom the spirit of the former command-style system of administration is still preserved) to increase wages of their staff is sometimes mistaken for a useful thing which brings down the inflation rate. However, it is already clear that such restrictions can wind up the spring imparting action to the mechanism of strikes and demonstrations of protest and can create a fairly explosive situation in the country, the government of which insists on the necessity of abstention from indexation and compensation of inflation for at least the first three months of the year.

The purport of this approach is incomprehensible: doesn't the liberalization of prices in the form of lifting state control over them also imply liberalization of the price of labour, this chief commodity? Importantly, the government should be able to influence relations between the employees and employers and ensure a balance of interests which would keep the industries going.

A normal and well-balanced system of prices can create conditions which will stimulate production.

Surely a Canadian- or Chinese-made down-lined coat cannot be equivalent to 500-800 kilos of butter or 10-15 cases of canned salmon (each case containing a couple of dozen cans), according to prices operating prior to January 2, 1992. Retail prices like that can't stimulate production and can only stimulate crime. Today the most important task is preventing food stuffs from becoming uses for multi-stage speculation operations, which was the case with imported goods. This means that market prices must be introduced for food sold both by state-run and private shops. To achieve this, all enterprises must be given a right to ask their own prices for their products. On the other hand, the enterprises must be issued credits on common grounds, pay the rent for the land they use, cover the cost of medical treatment of their staff, and be acknowledged as bankrupt when ineffective. Under normal accentuation (and a well-balanced system of prices) everyone stands to receive powerful incentives for expanding production. I hope we have enough will, common sense, and persistence in pursuing this goal.

What can be said about the actions of the government, in this light? Apparently the government continues to think is terms of two-digit figures (or at best, three-digit figures) in terms of the prices policy, despite the high dollar-exchange rate against the ruble. This is a gross mistake. Attempts to contain the growth of prices for staple consumer goods contradict the ultimate objective of the reform: to create a balanced system of prices, ensuring the correct proportion between the price and the cost. Under the available conditions, the price of sausage (150-200 rubles a kilo) – seemingly too high – in fact is too low (and out of proportion to other prices) when compared against the cost of certain other commodities. Importantly, the wages and salaries will have to rise too. But if the food prices are going to be artificially suppressed (for example as part of the government's attempts to block the wage rise) this will only eliminate any production growth incentives for the farms.

A carte blanche for the economic reformers

The true price balance is going to find its way into this country's economy anyway. However, if this proportion has to get here the hard way, this would not be the most advantageous situation, in terms of further economic development for the country, because this will cause trouble for the producers of many kinds of intermediate production, as well as the entire social infrastructure. This will bring about a drop in agricultural production, since only a small number of enterprises has real money, i.e., the goods which can be bartered. A decrease in consumption leads to a decrease of production, because the latter is limited by the level of effective demand. Consequently, peasants will produce more food only if they anticipate actual growth of price for their produce. That anticipation can have only one ground: true price proportion, which is still nonexistent here.

The absence of this proportion can have other negative effects as well: the price of a "deficit commodity" will be higher by virtue of this very circumstance and this will result in the decrease of production.

Today much depends on finality and unambiguousness of the Russian President's decision to side with the economic reformers whom he seemed to have given a carte blanche at the start. This uncertainty roots from the President's (who is also the head of the government) certain detachment from the policy of his Vice-Premier. The activities of a number of political parties and trade union organizations which are supposed to be guardians of the interests of the people give even more reason for concern. Wrong ideas about "just" prices are hardly in the interests of the people. The temptation to capitalize on criticizing the government – you can't lose playing that card today – is too strong and tantalizing. Nevertheless, it is only the success of the reform which can bring real success to this country now. Until then, each successive Cabinet will have no other choice but to carry on the programme of its predecessor, each time under more complex conditions. ■

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Ben Brahms:

All you need is a good tailor

Britain, Taiwan, the United States, Singapore, Lithuania, Hong Kong, Russia and Kazakhstan are only some of the countries with firms belonging to **Ben Brahms,** a big British entrepreneur. Born into an Anglo-German family in Lithuania, he spent his childhood in this what was in those days a Soviet republic. Hence his mastery of Russian. In his conversation with *New Times* special correspondent **Vladimir Zhitomirsky,** which took place in his London headquarters, he told about the difficulties to be overcome by Western business people who have dared "come in contact" with the economies of the former USSR republics.

– You maintain business relations with the former Soviet Union. Why?

– The Commonwealth, or, if you prefer, the economic space, has a great future. I think that in about ten years this region will be one of the world's most powerful ones, provided the people will find the right approaches to the solution of its problems.

The territory of the former USSR is inhabited by unusually skilled people. However, it is insufficient to manufacture a good product, it is absolutely necessary to establish relations with the market, to do the marketing, to have market facilities (transport, storage and outlets). It is very Russian to make first shoes, all of them for the left foot, and then try to sell them. The correct approach is to sell first and then produce.

– Sell first? You mean, mentally?

– First you must take care of the market. For example, I have been made an offer recently – someone from the CIS wants to sell a 5-kw generator for 7,500 dollars. It's a hopeless deal – too much money for so weak a generator. This is nonsense. These people believe they are guided by current market prices, but they act ignoring the demand and the current level of prices. The high level of development of your defence industry which occupied the second, if not the first place in the world, is explained by the large investments in marketing and scientific research work. They first found out what was in demand, and then tried to manufacture it.

– Are you talking about the production of weapons for export? Or about regular supplies to the army?

– About weapons at large produced by your military-industrial complex to ensure the might of the Soviet Armed Forces. It goes without saying that when you proved strong enough to beat the Americans in that sphere and become the world's No. 1, others showed interest in these products.

– But is it really a market when the state buys all arms at the price fixed by the producer?

– This only means that no expenses were spared as far as the marketing was concerned to achieve the task set.

– So why isn't Western business world in a hurry to cooperate with us?

– No one is asking the question of whether it is possible to invest in the United States. Of whether you will be deprived of your property and profit there. But when prospects to invest in Russia arise, you ask yourself about guarantees. You know that you may fall victim to state banditism. When we analyze the *perestroika* times we will have to admit that every time a man raised his head a bit it was cut off. Your monstrous legislation allowed the state to take away from him whatever he had earned in conformity with the law in force at the moment. It was a country of arbitrary law, a country with an extremely high level of corruption. The legislation is deliberately made utterly complicated, uncertain and allowing for arbitrary interpretation, which only encourages corruption. It is true, though, that now Mr Yeltsin has signed new decrees...

Why don't you translate into Russian some law, say, the British commercial legislation? There is no commercial legislation in Russia for the time being. Take England. It's enough to drop in the customs office and read for three minutes everything you must know about taxes. But is it possible to conduct business in a country where the rules of the game are every now and then completely changed? Recently there has been an abrupt rise in taxes on exported aluminium, which will scare away business people. To my mind, the country can't regain its economic position if it doesn't sell raw materials. If you introduce world prices on timber, coal, oil and non-ferrous metals, the problem of how to obtain a convertible ruble will be solved. The ruble will stabilize by itself, there is no need to invent anything special. And you must give people freedom. In what sense, you ask? They must abide by strict law, order is absolutely indispensable. But you must provide them with the possibility to work and earn. So far the situation is as follows: as soon as one becomes a bit rich, everything is taken away from him. One of my joint ventures was to bring in 40 million rubles. However...

– They are taking away these millions?

– Of course. Your laws are retroactive. A sort of presidential taxation has been imposed ex post facto. In the meantime it is not so difficult to rationalize all that. For instance, privatization. It's so easy to send a few people abroad so that they could see and engage in discussions there and make strategic decisions when they come back. Right?

– Perhaps these are normal disorders of growth?

– Capitalism in the former USSR is much more aggressive than what was in Chicago in the 1920s... Everything positive you had is destroyed, the military-industrial complex, for instance. I would have preserved all these excellent plants, paying the employees good money. I would have rented out land (instead of selling it, in order to prevent it from being bought wholesale by a few fat cats) and impose a 25-percent or so tax, depending on the quality of land. After five years, if the land is cultivated and its owner loves it, it could be sold to him for 50 percent of its current price. During these five years people will understand what is the culture of production. If a tenant doesn't want his plot of land he has the right to sell it to somebody else. This is the way I understand privatization of land.

Or take light industry. Today they try to privatize a plant which cost 40 million dollars, for 40 million rubles. Leave this state property alone, let the workers work. If it goes bankrupt, sell it by auction... And for the time being, suppose, you sew a certain quantity of suits, and I pay you 50,000

rubles, while another person who works at the same state factory produces much less and gets only 1,000. Your work is more productive and intense, whereas he is an idler. So you grow rich, not because of some machinations, but as a result of your intensive work. After five years we issue shares, by this time people will be accustomed to the idea of becoming share-holders, and you'll be able to buy more shares. This is privatization, and not the slogan "Redeem everything tomorrow!" Selling out apartments in the cheap barrack-like houses of the Khrushchev era is one thing, but privatizing plants and public buildings, especially by those who have connections in the Moscow City Soviet or elsewhere is a sheer swindle.

But light industry must be developed. Somebody may bring new equipment and pay the prescribed taxes. Taxation will help subsidize the military-industrial complex and railways... The unusually abundant salvage will feed all that.

– Any examples from your experience?

– Once I was going to raise the logs from the bottom of the river near Krasnoyarsk. I negotiated during one year to no avail. And you have a lot of sunken timber there! The river is 500 km long, 30 metres wide, and there is a layer of sunken logs 5 metres thick covering its bottom. You have more decaying timber than you export.

– Again about the MIC. If it is supported, it will go on flooding the internal market with arms which either will have to be bought by the government or sold abroad.

– You have misunderstood me. I did not mean to say you must go on producing armaments. The MIC must be reconverted, but this should be carried out reasonably. Look how it's done in Britain. First commissions are appointed which thoroughly examine the problem, and study the market in the first place. In your case it resembles the times of Khrushchev who demanded sowing corn everywhere the very next day... Today there is no stability in Russia, and if there is no stability in a state, there is no growth of production either. Today everyone tries to speculate – to buy something and sell it right away. There is no programme which would unambiguously convince me that one can invest in Russia. It's not often that you get returns after you have invested. You must give people a chance to get rich by their own efforts.

Drawing by Arkady Gursky

– But how can it be done when the plants are old and unprofitable?

– You should accept credits from a Western bank.

– Under what guarantees?

– That the plant will look for opportunities to produce what can be marketed abroad. You have an enterprise producing rockets. You want to reconvert it. What will clever people do in this case? They will invite one or several foreign experts and set them the task of determining what must be done in order that the enterprise could yield marketable and exportable products. Let them suggest their programmes – a short-term one, a medium-term one and a long-term one supplementing each other like flowers in a bouquet. The experts must be payed, say, 50 thousand. You have no money. But you can easily throw away 50 million rubles. So inviting experts is the cheapest and the most efficient way.

There have always been very few experts in the former USSR who could make feasibility studies. This is one of the reasons why it is so difficult for you to get loans – you can't explain how exactly you are going to spend these billions. You seem to possess everything – the unusually clever people which I admire and extremely rich natural resources. But you need a trifle more. You know, this is like a suit – it may be made of good fabric, but either a bit loose or a bit tight. A good tailor is needed. Trifles decide everything.

– You think that joint ventures, as they are now, have no future? Why?

– The "Soviet" side is represented by people who are state-employed, they reap no profit, hence their mentality. A person can work at five other places without overworking himself at your joint venture... You must allow people to earn foreign currency freely.

– I heard you took on lease or bought a large plot of land in Siberia...

– We ran a joint venture there...

– Which you oppose.

– Yes... Everything depends on the owner. We had supported the people, and they managed to redeem a plot for a timber enterprise. It used Japanese know-how to produce veneer for furniture. We gave them a start, as it were. Our joint venture is still functioning.

– What is the most difficult thing in your business relations with the former Soviet republics?

– I always trust people. It's terrible when somebody fails to keep his promise because he was failed by someone else. It just kills me when somebody fails to keep his word. It will be possible to cure oneself of this drawback when there is a free market and one becomes responsible for his own actions. So far under the conditions existent in Russia you have the opportunities to enrich yourself at the expense of some state structures. You can make a borrowing from some acquaintance of your wife's. If this credit is 50 million rubles worth you can convert the money into dollars. Even if you fail to produce a profit, your creditor will be slightly reprimanded at worst – one must know to whom to give credit privileges – and you will emerge unscathed...

– Ben, have you ever had to give a bribe?

– I hate this. This is not my approach. One should be compensated after he has accomplished something. A person who demands payment in advance is either a rogue or he is unable to do anything. A painter sells his pictures after he has painted them.

– You are talking about a creative person, and I mean someone on whom something depends – a signature, a licence...

– I always try to avoid everything which, in my opinion, is unethical. A bribe is a bribe and must be legally prosecuted. This is both an ethical norm and an act of prudence – for I could be jailed and lose everything.

LONDON–MOSCOW

The winds are not favourable for warship

Who needs the Black Sea Fleet and for what purpose?

Lt-Col. *Andrei Aksenenko*,
Candidate of Science (History)

Closely watching the polemics between Russia and Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet, one can easily see that it is centred on the old question of who will rule the Black Sea. "The Fleet is indivisible. It has been and will remain Russian," Moscow declared bluntly, and a no less blunt retort came from Kiev: "The Fleet must be divided. Ukraine has the same right to it as Russia." The argument was engendered by old notions about the history of the Black Sea. One country fears to lose the monopoly on the Sea and the other wants to gain it. The republics are trying to divide the Black Sea, just as they are doing with the entire legacy of the former Union.

There is nothing extraordinary in this dispute. History abounds in similar conflicts which usually ended in a transference of the ownership right to the Black Sea. Russia acquired its right to the Black Sea only two centuries ago – a rather short span by historic standards. For three centuries before that the same right was exercised by Turkey, which had ousted Byzantium. The latter upheld its dominance in the rough struggle against Kiev Rus.

The location of the Black Sea has long been nuisance to naval commanders

Under this angle, it appears that Kiev is not so ambitious in insisting on its right to the Black Sea Fleet and that Moscow's case is hopeless. Should Moscow reconcile itself to the new master of the Black Sea and recall with nostalgia its former naval power in the region?

That is not so, of course. The present situation opens a new stage in the history of the Black Sea. None of the littoral states will be able any longer to play the dominant role in the area, no matter how much they would like it. Radical changes in the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe, the Balkan Peninsula, the north Black Sea area, North Caucasus and Transcaucasia have led to the emergence of several power centres capable of counterbalancing each other and restraining any ambition. That is why the future situation in the Black Sea region will be characterized not by the leading position of one of its states but by mutual checking and collective security based on political rather than military principles.

In this sense the fears that Ukraine may become a major naval power in the Black Sea and threaten the interests of Russia and other states in the region have no ground whatever. Having established its control over the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, Kiev would soon be compelled to part with its illusions of dominance in the Black Sea, if it cherishes such illusions at all, and tackle an entirely different task, that of cutting down expenditure on the naval ships and bases. I will apparently have to lash this expenditure, leaving only ships for coastal defence. As a result, the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet will take on a financial-economic character for Ukraine and will in no way be linked with its naval ambitions.

It assumes the same character for Russia. The statements by members of the Russian parliament and naval chiefs that the Russian-owned fleet can fulfil strategic tasks in the Black Sea and the Mediterra-



The aircraft carrier Kiev passes through the Bosporus (1976)

nean are merely political phrase-mongering reflecting the ambitious interests of the naval circles. Whether it likes it or not, Russia, just as Ukraine, will have to adapt its Black Sea Fleet to the needs of coastal defence, because in the present situation this Fleet has completely lost its stratergic importance and for objective reasons is unable to fulfil any of the strategic tasks imposed on it. It would become senseless from the military and extremely dangerous from the political point of view.

Some geography

A Black Sea state must have two geographic positions in order to fulfil strategic tasks in the Mediterranean: the Crimea and the straits (Bosporus, Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles). The first position enables the Fleet to reach the coast of any other Black Sea nation in a line and effectively intercept any naval forces that would try to break through. The second position, linking the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, can be used for locking the entry into the Black Sea and for "jumping" into the Mediterranean.

The absence of control over any of these positions foils attempts to conduct an effective strategic naval policy in the region, whether offensive or defensive. This conclusion is borne out by the experience of tsarist Russia. After the seizure of the Crimea and the building of a naval base in Sevastopol the policy of Russia in the Mediterranean-Black Sea region was virtually reduced to the efforts of gaining possession of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. The earlier experience of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires proves that the simultaneous possession of the Crimea and the straits enabled them effectively to fulfil all strategic tasks in the region, both offensive and defensive. No wonder that Byzantium and Istanbul managed to keep the Black Sea and Mediterranean as their internal waters, reliably protecting them from an external attack.

It should be noted, however, that the Crimea and the straits are extremely vulnerable from land, and a vast land buffer zone must therefore be created around them. Without such a belt any talk about a stable presence on the Black Sea is meaningless because the seizure of the Crimea and the straits instantly calls the future of the navy in question. Incidentally, the Byzantium and the Ottoman empires lost their positions in the Mediterranean-Black Sea region as soon as they lost the needed depth of strategic land defence. That is why a state intent on preserving its domination on the sea had to ensure its security from land, and a state which tried to gain this domination had to raise a large and efficient land army.

Some strategy

Let's recall how Russia tried to carry out its plans with regard to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. At first, it ignored the specific features of the region and experienced several failures as a result. But then it began a planned development of the area near the Crimea and the straits. It turned out that Russia had to gain possession of the north Black Sea coast from the Dniester River to Kuban in order to localize the Crimea. For the purpose of blockading the Bosporus and Dardanelles it had to bring the Balkans and Asia Minor under its control, simultaneously neutralizing the dangers which could appear from contiguous territories. Therefore, before moving towards the Crimea, Russia had to create a security belt from Warsaw to Bucharest and from Kazan to Grozny, and before moving to the straits it was necessary to create the same belt from Berlin, Vienna and Rome to Cairo, Baghdad and Teheran.

It took Russia almost a century to achieve the first goal, if we keep count from the military expeditions organized by Peter the Great to Azov in 1695 and 1696 to the second Turkish war waged by Catherine the Great between 1787 and 1791, after which the Crimea was finally recognized as Russian property. Russia tackled the second problem for a much longer period, but failed to solve it. No wonder that it could not achieve the second goal. To gain a foothold in the Balkan Peninsula it would have to place under its control almost half of Europe, the Caucasus in Asia Minor, and nearly all main countries of the Middle East.

The fight for the straits cost tsarism five disastrous wars, including the First World War and the October Revolution in 1917. For the Bolsheviks, who continued the policy of their predecessors after the former structure of the empire had been restored, it cost two no less tragic wars, "hot" and "cold," and the war in Afghanistan.

Having exhausted its forces, tsarist Russia got stuck in the Lower Danube and Poland, Turkish Armenia and Iranian Azerbaijan, though its troops managed twice to reach Adrianople (Edirne) and Erzurum. Just as tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union disintegrated because to extreme military overstrain. However, it did considerably more than tsarist Russia, though it too was unable to gain all its objectives.

Moscow did not succeed in forming a united military-political bloc, though Bulgaria and Romania had been drawn into the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Following Russia's military goals the Soviet generals regarded these countries as a "corridor" through which the tank armies concentrated in the Odessa, cis-Carpathian and Kiev military districts could be moved to the Bosporus. The north and south-western flanks of this "cor-

Who will gain supremacy?

Photo from Financial Times (Britain)

ridor" were protected by troops stationed in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. True, Austria, Yugoslavia and Greece remained beyond tough Soviet influence. In case of need Moscow could set hopes only on the traditional kindly feelings of the Serbs and Greeks for the Russians and on Austria's stable neutrality.

Moscow's successes in Asia Minor were insignificant. The forward line remained in the area to which Russian troops had to retreat after the conclusion of a truce in 1918. Between 1943 and 1947 Stalin tried to shift the Soviet border closer to Erzurum by annexing "Armenian districts" from Turkey, but to no success. The 12 armoured divisions concentrated in Transcaucasia were apparently intended to compensate for the weak geographic position, as it was pointed out in the West. By all indications, a tank assault through the mountain ravines of the Armenian plateau to the Anatolian plateau and a further assault to Bosporus from the south were to be protected by "pro-socialist" Syria and Iraq. True, Iran remained a weak link, though after 1979 it could already be contained from the rear through Afghanistan.

The vulnerability of such designs was evident. An "expedition to to the straits" could grow into a global nuclear war, and this danger was not taken into account. The designs were not feasible even for conventional means, because the reaction of NATO countries and such Mediterranean states as Egypt and Israel was left out of consideration. Moreover, the Warsaw Treaty Organization did not look reliable. Contradictions between the Soviet Union and its allies could play a destructive role in a critical situation. Incidentally, historical experience shows that Russia's attempts to take the Black Sea straits under its control cost Moscow much trouble, many of its former allies adopted a neutral stand or sided with the opponents.

Some navigation

The 1,000-year struggle of the medieval world for Constantinople, brilliantly completed by Ottoman Turks in 1453, conclusively proved that the Bosporus and Dardanelles could be seized only by a simultaneous blow from four converging directions: two land (Balkan and Asia Minor) and two marine (Black Sea and Aegean). Neglecting this experience or lacking a possibility to implement it reduced any military effort to zero. The 15 abortive expeditions undertaken by Russia are clear proof of this conclusion.

The main problem confronted by tsarist Russia, in imposing a blockade on the Bosporus and Dardanelles from the Black and Aegean seas, was how to deploy its naval forces in the Mediterranean. The Black Sea Fleet was locked and could not send its ships for this purpose. As for the Baltic Fleet, every time Russia tried to establish its control over the straits (during the 1853-56, 1877-78 and 1914-18 wars) Western powers locked the Baltic squadrons in Kronstadt and compelled the Admiralty of Russia to cancel an expedition to the Dardanelles.

On the Black Sea there was no problem of gaining access to the Bosporus. However, Russia never had enough forces and means for a landing operation. When the straits were closed for the passage of naval vessels the Black Sea Fleet could not be quickly replenished with ships built abroad and at the Baltic yards. The Black Sea shipyards had a low capacity. There was a particular shortage of landing and transport means and, later, lack of aircraft carriers.

Have these problems been solved in Soviet times? Only partly, just as on land. The redeployment of the Baltic Fleet ships remaining an acute problem for Soviet Russia, the Nikolayev yards supplied the Black Sea Fleet with modern ships of various classes, aircraft carriers and, what is important, landing ships each costing 60 million rubles, according to Soviet press reports.

Nevertheless, in conditions of an extremely vulnerable and unstable presence in the Mediterranean the Black Sea Fleet was doomed to strategic inactivity. The previous historical experience showed that if ships of the Black Sea moved to the Bosporus without Mediterranean protection they would encounter NATO naval forces already on the approaches to the strait. In 1964 Moscow deployed part of the Black

Sea Fleet in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis. It was called the Fifth Mediterranean Squadron.

Soviet ships put out to the Mediterranean and, ignoring the apprehension of Turkey and its NATO partners, stayed for about 30 years there. This can be explained by the following circumstance. During that time the Soviet Union succeeded substantially in increasing military pressure on Turkey by consolidating its strategic situation in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor and due to its nuclear capability.

Moscow said at the time that the main purpose of the Fifth Squadron was to prevent the US Sixth Fleet from a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. However, it was practically impossible to fulfil this task. The Fifth Squadron did not have aircraft carriers and a developed system of logistical support. After the rupture of relations with Albania and Egypt Soviet warships could moor only at a port in Syria. Moreover, the complete dependence of the Fifth Squadron on supply from Sevastopol did not allow it to compete with the US Sixth Fleet and doomed it to a senseless waste of effort in case of a planned "breakthrough into the Black Sea".

Useful lessons of history

In short, the Soviet strategy had a lot of deficiencies. But the military planning evidently believed they could remedy the situation pending a new world-wide armed conflict. The strategists were in hurry, trying to squeeze the maximum out of the Soviet economy and the people. It seemed they were afraid that they would have no time to prepare, as it happened before the First and Second World Wars. But, thank God, history intervened and the crisis was settled in a natural way.

The break-up of the USSR put a stop to the construction of aircraft carriers at the Nikolayev shipyards and the wild run towards a precipice. The NATO leaders breathed with relief and seemed to overlook the passage of the last Soviet aircraft carrier *Kuznetsov* through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. We also breathed with relief, because the last hopes for realizing the ambitious dream vanished. The latest changes in the world and the Black Sea region seem to have closed the damned issue of straits for ever and have freed Russia of its onerous burden.

In the present situation Russia has lost the possibility to continue its military build-up in the main strategic directions leading to the straits. Some of these directions (Caucasian-Asian Minor and Black Sea) are now so vulnerable that they can hardly be considered reliable. In fact, the forward line of Russia in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor, in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean have been thrown 300 years back, to the time when it only began its advance towards the Crimea and the Bosporus. Can one talk in this situation about any strategic role for the Black Sea Fleet?

In lieu of conclusions

The proclamation of independence by Ukraine and the break-up of the Warsaw Treaty put an end to the "Balkan corridor" which had been created with difficulty over a long time. The "threshold" of the "corridor" is now on the Russian-Ukrainian, not Bulgarian-Turkish, border. Moreover, the troops and armaments prepared for an advance through this "corridor" have been "privatized" by Kiev. The entire system of protection has collapsed too. Soviet troops have been pulled out of Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. By the end of 1992 they will leave Poland and by the end of 1993 – Germany. In the south-west of the Balkan Peninsula Yugoslavia has ceased to exist as a socialist federal republic.

The Soviet army has also been paralyzed in the Caucasus. The emergence of independent republics in Transcaucasia has caused disunity among them, splitting into separate units which have lost their combat capability because of involvement in ethnic conflicts. The Soviet troops deployed in Transcaucasia have virtually lost strategic communication with Moscow. In these circumstances the question of their withdrawal from the region is likely to be raised soon.

After the proclamation of independence by the Baltic republics the use of the Baltic Fleet factor in Russia's Mediterranean policy has been dropped from the agenda. Any attempt to use ships of the Northern or Pacific Fleet for this purpose will encounter no less greater difficulties in view of the need to overcome the same problems of straits and narrow sea lanes. It will hardly be possible again to deploy ships of the Black Sea Fleet in the Mediterranean from which they were withdrawn two months ago. If this is done, the West will immediately raise the question of revising the convention on the regime of straits and lifting restriction on the entry of its warships into the Black Sea. The use of armed force, nuclear included, is senseless in such situation, because today the strategic nuclear forces of the former USSR can no longer be regarded as an effective means of influencing the United States and its NATO partners.

With the Crimea now belonging to Ukraine, Russia has no possibility to conduct a successful landing operation to the Bosporus. Having lost the northern Black Sea coast but retaining Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet, Russia will find itself deprived of any strategic advantage because in the event of an armed confrontation the city of "Russian naval glory" can share the fate of Port Arthur (during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05). The Russian Black Sea fleet will be able to fulfil tactical and strategic tasks provided Russia keeps a large army on its border with Ukraine. Moreover by its combat power this army must exceed the Ukrainian one two or three times. Otherwise, heading out to sea for the fulfilment of tasks contrary to Ukraine's interests, the Fleet can face the danger of losing its base and becoming isolated from the rear.

In this sense any action of the Black Sea Fleet – even if Russia retains it together with the Crimea – will be checked by Ukraine and Turkey, which has been able to retain the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Any movement of Russian warships towards the straits and the Mediterranean will lead to an alliance between these two Black Sea nations, with NATO standing behind such an alliance. Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia will not stand apart. Formulating new national defense doctrines, they will also strive to make their contribution to the maintenance of a balance on the Black Sea.

That is why Russia should now drastically cut, not build up its fleet on the Black Sea. Having lost the struggle for the straits and the Crimea, Russia is fundamentally deprived of its naval strategic capability in the region.

Postcript

One more question is to be answered. In the vacuum that has formed on the Black Sea, are Ukraine and Turkey likely to begin the struggle for dominance in the region? This possibility is ruled out. Ukraine will be unable to tackle the "strait issue" because it has no direct access to the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean and the Caucasus. To establish itself in the Bosporus, Kiev would have much greater work to do than Russia tried to accomplish. This work is beyond its capability. Besides, any attempt of Ukraine to carry out its strategic tasks in the Black Sea will easily be neutralized by Russia and Turkey. In this sense Russia has acted reasonably by supporting Turkey's initiative for setting up a Black Sea zone of economic cooperation.

In its turn, Turkey will never be able to establish itself in the Crimea and on the Northern Black Sea coast. As before, Ukraine together with Russia will stand in its way there. Moreover, Turkey will not strive to achieve this aim. Ankara's main concern is to retain Istanbul and the straits. As long as it sees there is no threat from the north Turkey will do everything so that no vessel hostile to Ukraine and Russia as well as to other Black Sea nations can enter the Black Sea.

Rash decisions should be avoided

Galina Sidorova

The US Secretary of State faltered for a while. It seemed he forgot the name of the country in which he was staying. "Uzbekistan," James Baker said at last, and his voice assumed the usual firm tone. This happened on the seventh day of his tour, after he had visited Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, as well as Yekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk-70. Some of the mentioned republics are torn by conflicts, others have strong Islamic leanings, and the two cities are known for their part in the defence industry of the former Union.

No other top foreign official made such a tour. Adjusting US foreign policy, the tireless Jim tried, as usual, to get first-hand knowledge of the situation. The USSR, one of the main objects of American foreign policy, fell to pieces and, accordingly, the American-Soviet relations broke into American-Russian, American-Uzbek, and so on.

My friends and colleagues from the team which accompanied James Baker expressed their feelings in one phrase: how was it possible for so long to combine the incompatible in one state – for instance, Tajikistan and Lithuania or Ukraine. The events which took place in the past on one-sixth of the globe were associated, by world opinion, with one country, the Soviet Union, a somewhat ambiguous and menacing notion. It is interesting that most Americans used the word "Russian" to describe everything which related to the USSR. After the break-up of the Union the adjective "Soviet" was more often used with regard to the former republics, which have a lot of common dramatic problems.

The Secretary of State evidently decided to make clear for himself once and for all not only the similarity but also distinctions between the former republics and define American priorities in regard to each of them. Moreover, the Americans again demonstrated their pragmatism. They sized up what is more advantageous – either wait for the time when the Central Asian republics begin to live according to democratic principles and respect human rights and then establish diplomatic relations with them, or establish such relations now and thus get an opportunity to influence the situation from within and prevent these republics from sliding into the hands of fundamentalist Moslems.

James Baker chose the second option. The presidents of the Central Asian republics vowed their allegiance to democracy and were requited. The Secretary of State decided to recommend President Bush to establish diplomatic relations with nearly all republics he visited during his tour. It semed to me, however, that as regards the prospects of Central Asian democracy, James Baker was more optimistic than the situation in these republics calls for.

Of all the republics of the former Union, the Americans expressed doubts only about relations with Georgia. Washington did not have a liking for deposed Gamsakhurdia and did not recognize him diplomatically. However, it did not approve of the way in which the Georgian president was removed. Nevertheless, Baker met with Tenghiz Sigua, head of the provisional government. But he did that in Moscow, and at the last moment.

On top of the agenda of talks Baker had with Russian leaders were problems of disarmament.

A new political level in relations was demonstrated by the American proposal to set up a joint early warning centre (true, without joint defence against ballistic missiles), and by the decision to provide for Russia special railway cars and "security blankets" for the transportation of nuclear weapons.

Two episodes attracted my attention.

One of them is connected with a visit to Chelyabinsk-70.

A guard post. Within an encircled area stands a huge building with a purely Soviet signboard saying that it is an all-Union research institute of theoretical physics. In all windows I saw the heads of people, thousands of nuclear scientists welcoming the guest. This reminded me of Eduard Shevardnadze's first appearance at the NATO headquarters in Brussels two years ago. The employees of the "den" of our main opponent poured out into a hall, forming a live applauding corridor.

Like a guest professor, James Baker entered a lecture-hall and took his seat in front of "students" – doctors and candidates of science – ready to deliver a short lecture on the danger of proliferation of nuclear technology. However, the head of the institute was the first to speak. Instead of asking the American guests the hackneyed question "What will you give us?," he told them what programmes our country can offer for joint research. I think the visit to Chelyabinsk-70 imparted a new dimension to the American idea of establishing an international centre of support for scientists of the former Union.

Democracy for Central Asia, "security blankets" for Russia

The other episode is connected with Yekaterinburg. It was rumoured that the Secretary of State was unable to go to a chemical plant because he was in a Russian bath-house the previous night. I heard another reason for a change in the programme of his stay in the city. At the last moment one of the local representatives of the Defence Ministry did not allow the Americans to visit the military installation. Baker did not phone Marshal Shaposhnikov.

I think that the Russian-American relations are today inhibited not only by the burden of mistrust and armaments. Moscow and Washington continue to vie with each other for the lead. Russia has surpassed the United States in the proposed volumes of strategic arms cuts so much (to 2,500 and 4,500 warheads respectively) that the Americans fear to lose sight not only of their Russian partner but of a possible agreement. A radical approach can only be welcomed. I have the impression, however, that it is a propagandistic rather than a well-thought-out action ignoring the immense expenditure connected, ironically enough, with disarmament.

Or take the question of re-targeting the missiles. The Americans are not enthusiastic about Moscow's revolutionary proposals. They refer to technical problems and the impossibility of control. I asked Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Kozyrev whether Moscow's persistence means that Russia is technically prepared and the United States is not prepared to retarget the missiles. The ministers replied that neither country is prepared technically, that it is a political goal.

Perhaps now that we have become friends and partners, a new approach should also be taken to disarmament. Without trying to score propaganda points, the two countries should discuss the problem in a businesslike way, quietly and judiciously, taking their situations into account.

Economics in a sombrero

The poverty of the Latin American countries arises not from the market-oriented character of their economies, but from the fact that they are not yet sufficiently market oriented

The Mexican economist Luis Pasos, a convinced proponent of market economy, spent some time in the Soviet Union in the early 1970s and, familiarizing himself with its economy, quickly became a passionate critic of the Soviet Union. At home, as well, Pasos had criticized the administrative-distribution system leanings of the "anti-imperialistic" governments, and became well known for his opposition. Now, Latin America is rebuilding its economies, bringing them into alignment with the norms of a civilized market. **Yuri Kudimov,** *New Times* correspondent, discusses the progress of these attempts with **Luis Pasos.**

New Times. Market-oriented reforms – privatization, the cutting down of customs tariffs, tax and credit incentives to private enterprise – which were begun everywhere in the Latin American countries during the 1980s – continue to this day. But the Latin Americans have yet to see themselves becoming better off. Why?

Luis Pasos. The main lesson from these current reforms is this: don't stop halfway along the path. For a long time, we irrationally used our wealth, and as a result, were left in poverty. Even now our governments can't rid themselves of their urge to interfere with our economies. Maybe this is because they consider their decisions wiser than objective economic laws, or perhaps they dislike any limitations being placed on their prerogatives. We also have to take into account opposition to the reforms from below, from nearly all strata of society – something similar to the Russian historical "potato riots." Reforms aggravate the social tensions which compel politicians to reject recommendations from economists. And because these changes are being slowed down, we are forced to wait to see their results.

N.T. From where, in countries with market-oriented economies, come these anti-market sentiments?

L.P. The people have become used to not having freedoms, and this habit is difficult to overcome. Zoologists say that a wild animal feels better in his cage, where he doesn't have to worry about combing out his fleas. For hundreds of years, Latin America was closed from trade with all other countries excluding Spain, whose economy was far from well-off. The traditions of the colonists have not totally died out yet, and a Latin American entrepreneur would feel no qualms about attacking his problems through means of bribery or use of acquaintances. This is easier than improving quality and efficiency of labour.

You can also understand the poor who believe the promises of the socialists, politicians and entrepreneurs who cry for protectionist measures. Even the Japanese protect their own rice producers against any competition from outside. In a word, the historically imperfect Latin American market is very difficult to reshape. But what is important is that the majority understand the necessity of such reorganization.

Inflation grimaces: the number of noughts on the Brazilian paper money has increased, but its purchasing capacity has not

N.T. Your colleagues as well as others say the large and burdensome external debt of Latin America is one of the root causes of its economic and social woes. Does it not follow that you should sense danger from Western credits, according to the saying, *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes?*

L.P. If we were to waste the credits, as has been done here and in your case as well, on the purchase of highly desirable consumer goods and even items of luxury, to say nothing of keeping afloat half dead state-run enterprises, the credits could, of course, turn out to be harmful. Let's say that through their use we lessen the negative consequences of incorrect economic policies, and the government gets the chance to put off the urgent reforms. At the same time, without credits neither Latin America nor Russia, I think, would be able to develop at any great speed. The apparent way out of this would be to give the loans not to the government, but to private enterprises.

N.T. In Latin America, there has long existed a mistrust of foreign capital. Do you see a foundation for this persistent antagonism?

L.P. This is decreasing a bit. Latin Americans often prefer to work for foreign firms these days. These firms pay better, there are better working conditions, and workers become more highly qualified. Foreigners are often more solicitous about the use of natural resources and their technology conforms more exactly to the ecological laws of developed countries. And often their goods are of a higher quality.

But the conditions for foreign investments here vary from those set out in other countries. They are protected more poorly, and their future chances are less certain. It's a sad situation because capital available for use is snapped up by others. And from the point of view of economic development, investments are more advantageous and preferable to the credits. Although one doesn't interfere with the other.

Of course, it's a mixed blessing when a powerful international investor appears in a weak or down-and-out country. I am not concerned about Latin America being bought out to its core. The investor's business is production, transportation and entertainment, while Latin America belongs to its people. I don't see how this investor could buy up the entire Russia, but nevertheless he must be reckoned with. Joining the world economic community presupposes observance of its rules. Market mechanisms fall into place not at once, but are guided by specialists, for example, those from the International Monetary Fund. Those who will bring things into line are not only knowledgeable, but harsh as well. However, to face them, it seems to me, is easier than to be left behind in poverty.

MEXICO CITY

Hope for salvation

The West tries to save the Commonwealth of Independent States from complete economic and social collapse and thus protect itself

One dank morning, the first military transport aircraft with food aid for the CIS took off from the airport in Frankfurt am Mein. The far from numerous TV and photo reporters, mostly Americans, shot the indispensable scenes – James Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher blessing the aid for yesterday's enemies – and hurried to the buses to shelter themselves from rain and piercing wind.

This was the beginning of Operation Hope, organized by the European Community, the USA and Japan.

Who more?

A few days before this ceremony, Bonn and Washington debated over how to ensure that not only American Hercules aircraft, placed nearby, but also the Boeings of German Luftwaffe positioned a bit farther off, were in the field of vision of TV cameras. An insignificant detail behind which is the rivalry between the two countries about the size of aid being given to the CIS. Bonn would like the USA to be more active and it did not like at all that Americans tried to present Operation Hope as primarily their own, despite the fact that the foodstuffs and other products sent by the air bridge have been bought mostly with the money of European taxpayers. Incidentally, Americans sent, for the most part, the foodstuffs from the reserves designed for operation Desert Storm.

Today, 400 flights are organized by Europeans and 50 by Americans. According to the information furnished by the EC Commission, financially it looks as follows: Germany made the lion's share of DM70 billion, one third of this amount being credits and credit guarantees. Germany is followed by Italy, which has given DM9.3 billion, then follow the USA with 7.2 billion, France with 3.4 billion, and Britain with its modest contribution of 220 million.

Some economists believe that the figure 70 billion is an exaggerated one. In any case, Bonn is generous enough, though it has tremendous problems with the new federal lands requiring considerable investments. When the Bundestag debated the question of aid for Russia, parliamentarians of both the ruling coalition and the opposition were surprisingly unanimous. Their appeals to prevent the large masses of population from being empoverished were absolutely sincere. Radically-minded members of the left-wing opposition even suggested acquitting Russia of all its debts as an act of good will for the sufferings Germany had caused the peoples of the USSR during World War II.

The EC is not yet prepared to share such feelings. Foreign and Finance Ministers agreed to float credits to Russia alone, since the latter had assumed the major burden of debts of the former USSR. The republics of the CIS which will agree to jointly honour the Soviet country's debts may also count on the EC's financial benevolence. The Community allowed DM5.2 billion to meet the needs of the Commonwealth as credits or direct supplies of goods or various kinds of equipment.

This amount will probably be reduced, because Russia has turned down Brussel's proposal to make a trilateral deal, under which Belgium would finance purchases by Moscow of food products from the countries of the former "socialist community."

Not by altruism alone

It would be naive to believe that the massive aid by the West has been dictated only by altruist considerations.

The major part of the aid delivered by air these days is directed to Moscow and St. Petersburg. It is not by accident that these cities were chosen by the European Community – they play the key role in preserving stability, albeit very relative, in Russia. The West intends to consolidate Boris Yeltsin's position, being aware that today the most likely but undesirable alternative to the latter is either the buffoon son of a lawyer, Zhirinovsky, or an authoritarian national-patriot.

It was mentioned in one of the EC classified documents that programmes of technological (apart from humanitarian) aid for the republics of the CIS were primarily aimed at creating a democratic system and implementing large-scale reforms.

There are enough variants and suggestions of various degrees of competence and scope. One of them was worked out by scholars of the Mainz University headed by Prof. Werner Weidenfeld, one of Helmut Kohl's close advisers.

The scholars believe that the understanding of the fact that the overcoming of confrontation on the continent means also East European problems becoming the concern of West Europeans as well, still hasn't taken root in the West. The East-West conflict has left a great many small ones, though at

The CIS is capable to swallow the entire German economy, the newspaper *Das Parlament* (Germany) warns

times they are more acute. The West will have to understand that Eastern Europe is faced not by reforms or an updating of former structures, but by a change of systems which is going on amidst more hardships than previously expected. Therefore the necessity arises to increase the scope of Western aid and replace occasional campaigns with a well-thought out and consistent strategy.

A successful strategy will be possible only on the conditions of a strict control over the distribution of aid and the implementation of projects. This will require a control mechanism suitable for both sides. It is possible, for instance, to create an organization analogous to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation which came into being after World War II. This time the Central and East European countries must be represented in it. On the one hand, this would provide a legal basis for the control over the aid, and on the other, it would reduce the apprehensions existent in the West that a certain capital (Berlin is implied) will alone dictate its conditions.

What will fill the vacuum?

Of course, the authors of the analysis realize that Russia abounds in conservative forces which reject the Western system of values point blank.

German scientists believe that it is necessary to increase the number of advisors and intensify the help in creating democratic institutions, especially legal and managerial ones. It is also worthwhile to consider the question of opening in the ex-socialist countries "European Houses," in which something like courses in economics, education and culture could be orgnaized.

It is only natural that the scholars of the Mainz University pay major attention to concrete suggestions concerning economy and rehabilitation of finances. One of the key ideas is that the countries which have begun dismantling the system must be more closely tied to the EC capable of exerting a stabilizing influence on them. This will require facilitating trade relations, but rehabilitation of finances and stabilization of national currencies is the priority task. Alleviation of the CIS' debt burden is proposed to this effect, which will help integrate it into the world economic system, which, in its turn, is inconceivable without its membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Bilateral agreements with each of the republics are not ruled out. However, it is impossible to count on immediate financial injections – they must be preceded by explicit definite steps in the direction of reforms.

Here the opinion of German scholars differs from that of the functionaries of the EC Commission. The latter believe that for the time being it is premature to condition the continuation of aid on economic and political reforms in the CIS.

This is probably correct. However, it raises doubts – the massive aid from the West may enhance apathy and the tendency to rely on the rich and kind foreign uncle, which is rather widespread in our society. Formerly all claims were addressed to the state, which was held responsible for employment, education, housing, health care and so on. The state established itself as a guarantor of existence, it was the power, whether good or bad is of little importance now. Parcels with food and donations can only fill in the most glaring gaps, and even this temporarily and partially. Western help will be really efficient only in case that the indispensable prerequisites for normal development are created.

Dmitry Pogorzhelsky,
New Times correspondent
BONN

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AVIS

The "Terminator" helps Bush

Yevgeny Rusakov

George Bush won the primaries in New Hampshire, but it was a Pyrrhic victory. A little over half the voters (53%) supported Bush, while the conservative Republican Patrick Buchanan got 37% of the votes. That caused something like panic in the White House: getting elected president depends on the ability of the candidate to win wide support in the Granite state. Everyone still expects Bush to become the Republican candidate, but he is faced with a hard and exhausting battle with the assertive Buchanan, who has been known as a bully since childhood.

The primaries in New Hampshire are a kind of figure skating school for the presidential candidates

The events were developing with lightning speed for the Democrats as well. The position of the Arkansas governor, Bill Clinton, who used to be the head runner, began to melt before the eyes like the ice in the lakes of New Hampshire in the unusually spring-like warmth of February after he was accused of having an affair and trying to dodge the draft during the Vietnam war. The former Senator Paul Tsongas from the neighbouring state of Massachusetts who was not taken seriously only a month ago began to pick up momentum. He won the 18th of February, but Clinton managed to significantly lessen the gap and together with Tsongas remains one of the front runners for the presidency from the Democratic Party.

Three other seekers for the top job in the White House – Kerrey, Harkin and Brown – finished neck and neck. That was also something of a surprise.

The region of pique vests

All over the empty Willow Avenue, which turns into a neon desert when the evening lights come on (in small American towns practically everyone gets around in cars), hung posters "Bill Clinton for president" and a little further on, "Buchanan for president."

In the centre of Manchester on Elms Street with its two story houses, where the headquarters of the candidates are located close together, walked vocal battalions of schoolchildren. The kids who were for Kerrey shouted to Tsongas' followers: "Regional!" "Regional!" (alleging that outside New England he is a nobody), and those who haven't lost faith in Bush yell: "Pat Buchanan, not." The rivals answer accordingly.

Each New Hampshirite from a one-year-old to the very old is a born politician. The baby has a chance to be in the arms of the future president, and a representative of the older generation – a chance to shake hands with him, or if he wishes, be photographed together. When going around to meet the people, nine times out of ten any president risks bumping into the correspondents who are following on his heels or into enthusiastic staff members of his support group. A real voter isn't someone you run into every day. That's why the candidate feverishly looks for a child or someone old: he knows for sure that they are the "people."

Will Schwarzenegger help Bush win out?

My first talk took place right at the Pinkerton Academy where Bush's first pre-election meeting was held. Two boys stood holding the banner "Bush is a liberal." In Republican jargon that is sort of abuse.

– In what way is he a liberal?

– In comparison with Buchanan,– one of them, a stoutish rosy-cheeked fellow about 25 answered my question. – Four years ago I helped in Bush's election campaign in our state. I worked hard for Bush, but he betrayed me – he said he won't raise the taxes, but broke his promise. And what about the law on quotas when hiring or unemployment benefits? Bush went to war to kick out Saddam. So? He's still there in Baghdad. I don't believe in Bush any more. I'm for Buchanan now.

I spoke with a fifty-year-old teacher, Mike Sokolowsky, a short thin mustached Pole, in a small gym where the Senator from Iowa, Tom Harkin was campaigning.

– Harkin? He promises too much. Clinton is a baby face, and here many keep waiting for another John Kennedy, but he is slicky... No one is sure that some other scandal won't surface from his past. Kerrey is detached. As a Vietnam veteran who lost a leg in the war, we expected him to have guts, soul and heart. But it seems he lacks just that. Nobody is going to change anything. But I'm for Tsongas because he is a man of honesty and integrity who was victorious in the most difficult of situations. The Republican Buchanan is also a real fighter.

What is "conjugal loyalty"?

The New Hampshirites with the ease of pros use the term "electability," which means the ability of the candidate to beat the rival from the other party at presidential elections. Actually this is the most valuable and essential quality which the party ranks and educated voters look for in those running for president. Another important term in the American political lexicon introduced at the beginning of the television era by the guy who came up with the idea of information society, Marshall MacLuhan, is the "message."

A tall blond bearded guy with a tired pale face which didn't fit in with the general holiday mood of Clinton's meeting, said why he was going to vote for the senator from Arkansas:

– Clinton is well-versed, very, very intelligent and articulate. Tsongas is also very good and his ideas are similar in essence with those of Clinton. But Tsongas, unlike Clinton, has a message but hasn't the media... What about the accusations against the Senator? His infidelity doesn't bother me. I don't know what that really means anyway. His refusal to serve in the army is also blown out of proportion. I myself served in the army before the war in Vietnam, and I remember well how both adults and youth were confused. We couldn't even find the words to express our feelings. But Clinton at 23 could, and explained very well why he was against the war and why he decided after all not to dodge the draft if his number came up.



Bush's main rival, Patrick Buchanan, has always been known as a bully

Quite by chance, or rather thanks to its climate, New Hampshire came to occupy a unique place in American politics. When, at the beginning of the century they held the first primaries in America, the local politicians wisely decided to conduct them in winter, before roads were washed out in the spring. The state at that time was a backwoods and it still is to this day, though the highways are more or less in order now.

In 1952 a "beauty contest" was first conducted among the presidential candidates in the primaries. The result exceeded the boldest expectations.

President Harry Truman, looking out of the Oval office with Olympic calmness at some elections in some New Hampshire, lost to Senator Estes Kefauver, who had gone around meeting people and shaking their hands. Soon afterwards he had to drop out of the race entirely. The Republicans conducted a successful primary campaign of Dwight Eisenhower and it became the springboard to the White House for him.

Speech in a beer joint

From that time on New Hampshire played the role of a figure skating school or team competitions in gymnastics in the primaries in America: if you didn't do well there, you wouldn't get into the finals. For some this small state becomes the springboard to the White House, for others – into political oblivion.

The fate of the future president is decided by not more than 250,000 Democrats and Republicans taking part in separate elections.

New Hampshire is proud of its political savvy when it comes to picking future presidents and value their privilege. They not only take the primaries seriously, but actively participate in volunteer work on the primary campaign committees: they organize meetings, collect donations, put up posters, send out letters, go door-to-door, and make phone calls, etc.

And it doesn't even bother the New Hampshirites that with each election the wall between the candidates and the voters created by journalists is getting higher. At least twenty journalists accompany each politician and it's almost impossible to squeeze in through the palings of the TV cameras even for fellow reporters. When you read that I asked Buchanan what he thinks about giving aid to the CIS, don't take me literally. Actually I was about 3 metres away from him, and three times over the shoulder of a colleague from Israel, who got in a question about the American guarantees on loans to his country, I had shouted as loud as I could: "What about Russia?" I managed to talk to Clinton face to face at a party, but that time a rock band was playing loud on one side, an assistant was pulling him towards the exit by the arm on another side, and from a third side TV cameras were literally touching our faces.

And nevertheless New Hampshire remains the only state where the average American can see a live candidate and even talk with him.

After New Hampshire a new game begins. Having given his victory speech from a chair in a beer joint two paces from our

Again one of the contenders was accused of immoral behavior. This time it was Clinton, whose name was associated with a former cabaret singer

group of journalists, the talkative and excited Buchanan didn't forget to remind his followers that now the primaries would take on an absolutely different character and he would have to rely on TV and mass undertakings.

"We are all one of you"

As soon as Pat Buchanan announced he was running for president, he immediately got out of his Mercedes and into a minibus and moved, together with his wife, a splendid blond, from their luxuriant mansion near Washington to a modest hotel in Manchester.

In the TV commercials this successful newspaper columnist and TV reporter movingly says that the last weeks he went around the whole state and saw all the people's problems. "New Hampshire, don't fool yourself again," he says accusing Bush of being indifferent to the state's problems.

New Hampshire really does have it bad. It is one of the most God forsaken states in America. During the industrial revolution in the last century, New England was the industrial heart of America, and hard-working, obstinate and resourceful Yankies, mainly New Englanders, settled in these parts. But later New York became the financial centre, industry moved to the Middle West and the farmers were squeezed out by grain and meat from the prairies.

Finally, during the Great Depression in the thirties the largest textile factory in the world closed in Manchester. Empty red-brick buildings with high narrow windows stretch for a kilometer along the Merrimack River and remain a monument to the permanent crisis of New Hampshire. In some places there still remain farms and fishermen, but the greater part of the proud Yankies make their living off tourists and in the service sphere. "And now a snow recession," summed up the head of the USIA New York Centre for the Foreign Press, Nicholas King, who was accompanying us. He is a native of these parts and worries about the people of his state who have been deprived of the income from mountain ski resorts along with everything else.

In short, they don't like rich snobs in these regions and never will. Anyone wanting to land in the White House must begin by demonstrating his closeness to the people before the astute and untrusting New Hampshirites.

Clinton reminds everyone that he lost his father in childhood and had to make his own way.

Bob Kerrey, the Senator from Nebraska, stresses that he grew up in a family with seven children and promises to do something about unemployment.

"I am not having sleep..."

Even Bush, who came from a wealthy family and doesn't feel very much at ease outside his usual circle of friends, has to come down off his pedestal. One time he met with the people in a jacket and rumpled pants, the collar of his shirt unbuttoned, another time he amused a small girl with a mitten made to look like a bear's face. The participants in the meeting at the Pinkerton Academy near Manchester had people pass through a metal detector, but that was like child's play in comparison with the precaution measures at the Waldorf-Astoria where guards in bullet-proof vests bearing machine guns met us in front of the President's suite. And Bush looked a lot more human and much warmer than usual at the meeting. He had to.

The head of the President's council on physical fitness spoke at the meeting. When the powerful figure and familiar suntanned rectangular face with the low forehead and powerful jaw appeared on the platform, the audience went wild. I checked my watch: there was a minute of hysterics before his speech, three minutes during his speech and another minute when Arnold Schwarzenegger came out together with Barbara Bush. When the "Terminator" with his metallic barritone asked everyone to say to Buchanan at the elections "So long, Baby!" there was a pandemonium. By the way, Buchanan saw the "Terminator's" speech as a sign of panic in the camp of the White House head.

Senator Tom Harkin outdid all the rest in demonstrating his closeness to the people: "The country needs a president who understands the people and sympathizes with them. I understand the people as Bush never has. My father was a miner who didn't finish the eight grade, my mother was a poor immigrant... They raised six children in a three-room house,... my sick brother was fired when he was 23."

Here the Senator demonstratively outstretched his hands and raised his voice, "I'm not having sleep because I want the average man to feel good. And for them a good life isn't a yacht and a Rolex watch. For them a good life is having their own home, having a job, and being able to send their children to college." The audience broke out shouting "Harkin! Harkin! Harkin!"

To get his message across, Buchanan called the statement of the President a "lie." The President responded likewise. Harkin called the economic measures of the White House bullshit and said that to participate in the presidential election campaign meant to "let your rear hang out."

Indeed, American democracy is no business for the weak-hearted.

MANCHESTER, NEW HAMPSHIRE

Photos from Time and Newsweek

The World Paper

IMF: Capital of the world



These two provide financial and other support to governments. The Bank, involved primarily in long-term loans, committed some US$22 billion to nearly 80 countries in 1991 alone. The IMF, providing surveillance over the economies of 156 member countries and financing to countries facing external payment problems, last year disbursed about $26 billion to over 50 countries.

But they are also accused of interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states; worshipping the market-oriented philosophy of the Chicago School; serving as debt collectors for commercial banks; and administering shock therapy at the expense of the poor.

This issue examines the balance of achievement and failure of these two powerful institutions.

A general once explained to Napoleon why he couldn't open fire on the enemy: "First, we have no guns..."

Today, the general might be looking for the purse strings. For it is economics not armaments that decides the fate of nations and national governments. Cash is king. He who has capital, or access to it, occupies the high ground.

It is in this context that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world's two greatest multinational lending and finance institutions, have taken on a role almost larger than life.

Call for fewer guns, more butter

As developing countries emerge from the debt crisis of the 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank have changed policy to focus on world poverty – in part by slashing military spending.

Bank President Lewis Preston, a 40-year veteran of J.P.Morgan, announced the new policy in a surprising speech at the annual meeting of the IMF and the Bank in Bangkok last October. The Bank's lending, he said, "should be linked to a country's effort to reduce poverty."

The IMF followed through by announcing that it would use its financial and political resources to encourage countries seeking to borrow to convert military spending into investment in health and education.

"Our regional president told Pakistan in no uncertain terms recently that it ought to cut its military expenditures and redirect it into the civilian economy," says Bank spokesman John Mitchell. "In the 'New World Order,' we can't afford to ignore military policy anymore."

Mitchell explains that there are two reasons for the new concern about the welfare of the poor. It is in part a response to the criticism in the 1980s that the Bank and the IMF were more concerned about economic efficiency than social justice. And it is reassurance to the Third World that it won't be forgotten in the rush to assist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The new policy is possible because whole continents now accept the wisdom of slashing budget deficits and freeing markets, once the controversial IMF vision of the world but now called the "emerging consensus" on economic policy. The wave of reform swept Latin America late in the 1980s, turning a dismal dept hole into the darling of the IMF and the Bank. Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela and Chile are re-establishing themselves as reliable customers for loans from private banks.

The booming, so-called Tigers of Asia (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and others) are cited with pride as countries that accepted the orthodoxy of fiscal reform and structural adjustment. In Africa, Morocco seems serious about privatization and is entering the second phase of economic restructuring, while Nigeria begins restructuring its debt this year. Even India, one of the last bastions of old-style development planning, and for long a critic of the IMF and the Bank, has launched an impressive program of reform that has merited loans totaling US$2.7 billion, with more to follow.

Some governments, in fact, are adopting reforms that go beyond those suggested, and the IMF's managing director, Michel Camdessus, says that while his predecessors spent much of their time edging governments toward reform, he listens to governments talking about their desire for change.

But the Bank and the IMF are now rushing to assist Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS – the former Soviet Union) a speed that belies the idea that they are sluggish international bureaucracies. In less than three years, the two have lent more than $11 billion in Eastern Europe. Loans of $6 billion have been approved for Poland, the region's boldest reformer, although it has not met all the proposed conditions. Within three months of rejoining the IMF in September, Czechoslovakia received $1.8 billion in assistance.

The IMF has sent technical assistance teams to five East European countries to advise on problems ranging from foreign currency operations to privatization of state-owned industries.

But neither agency expects fast and easy results in Eastern Europe. As one official said: "Much of the zeal is the fervor of new converts. Helping will be extremely difficult since they don't have the intellectual tradition to distinguish between good and bad advice. And, since this is uncharted territory, in some cases neither do we."

East Europe's cold-turkey transition from communism to capitalism may become the most formidable challenge yet to the IMF and the Bank. They will remain powerful also in the CIS, Africa and elsewhere where national economies are in dire straits.

Brad Durham
WASHINGTON, USA

Those who have the money call the shots

Jeffrey Sachs is a rarity in academia: he practices what he preaches. Sachs is a professor of international trade at Harvard University and serves as an economic adviser to several governments in Latin America and Eastern Europe. He is one of the architects of the economic reform introduced in Poland in 1990 and is currently leading a team of economic advisers for Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Wherever he has worked, Sachs has helped shape relations between the IMF and the World Bank and local governments.

Based on your experience advising governments from Bolivia to Poland, how would you describe the roles of the IMF and the World Bank in helping these countries overcome economic catastrophe?

On the whole, these institutions play a positive role, although it could be improved. The IMF tells the truth, which is that when a country tries to live beyond its means it is going to end up with high instability. To end instability, it generally has to take politically difficult austerity measures. That basic message is simple, straightforward and correct. The IMF helps not only by delivering a strong message but also by providing financial support to countries that pursue reasonable reforms.

The role of the IMF has been very significant for

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number of years, principally because there have been a large number of countries in severe financial difficulty. Perhaps 50 or 60 countries experienced a foreign debt crisis in the 1980s and had to turn to the IMF for financial assistance. The IMF does not force itself on any country; countries come to the IMF because they're in desperate need of help.

Now, when the Cold War is over and economic factors gain in importance, are the IMF and the Bank acquiring the role of a super-government that interferes in the internal matters of nations?

In Poland, some politicians have recently said: Why should we deal with the IMF on the terms we have; we should deal with the IMF on equal terms." It's nice rhetoric, but illusory. Poland is not giving the IMF a loan. Poland is in trouble, it needs help. So there's something one could call "unequal" about that. The IMF did not throw itself at Poland.

What I really detest is the white-bot, populist rhetoric that pounds the table and says, "We wouldn't deal with the IMF." That's just stupid. These are people who don't want to observe the basic laws of economics.

Is the IMF applying the same therapy to all countries?

The laws of economics are universal. The basic principles that the IMF advocates are correct, but the governments know the local conditions better.

It can't be denied that the IMF is dominated by rich nations of the Northern Hemisphere. Some accuse it of practicing a velvet form of neocolonialism.

The IMF is dominated by the creditor nations. It's a lending institution. Those who have the money call the shots. I wouldn't regard that as neocolonialism, however. A country doesn't have to go to the IMF. It goes there because the IMF has something to offer.

But I have had major fights with the IMF over the extent of international assistance that is provided to a country. When a country is taking the right measures, it deserves international support.

In these cases, the only realistic way forward is to cut the debt and renegotiate the contract to more realistic levels so that the creditors absorb some of the loss.

The IMF should push hard for realism. It should absolutely reject populism. It should insist that governments be serious preparing budgets. But after it has done that, it should remember that societies can have complex and often self-defeating reactions to crisis. They can be pushed too far, over the edge. Even when a good government wants to undertake reforms, it may find itself powerless in the face of sharp social reactions. The IMF should recognize when its recommended measures are simply too painful to be absorbed. At that point, the IMF should turn to the rest of the world, to the rich countries, and say, "This country is doing all it can, and now it is your turn."

European Bank mixes hope and ecus

At Lancaster house, an elegant former palace on London's Green Park, Great Britain painfully negotiated the end of her world empire. But when the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was born there one year ago amid tremendous pomp and circumstance, the palace was transformed from a place of decay to one of life.

Addressing the representatives of the seven post-communist countries of Eastern Europe for whom the bank was exclusively created, French President François Mitterrand said, "No doubt, hard times lie ahead for you – and you have had enough of a system that guaranteed hard times."

And the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, known as the European Bank, is meant to be a sign of hope. The bank has three priorities: assist the developing democracies of Eastern Europe, establish market economies in the region, and protect the environment of Eastern Europe, which has been ravaged by careless development.

The bank's first president, Frenchman Jacques Attali, has made bold pronouncements on its mission: "We want to double the size of continent (by joining East and West) quided by the principles of the free market and democracy." But this lofty language does little to assuage the fears of more down-to-earth bankers in the European Bank.

It is still unclear whether politics or economics will prevail in the character of the European Bank.

In a recent interview, Attali stressed several times that the bank will not be a charitable institution, but a profit-oriented bank operating on economically sound principles. Nonetheless, Attali acknowledged that the European Bank "will go (to Eastern Europe) with more courage than the private sector. We have to live off our money, but we can afford a little more time than the private sector to wait for the profits."

With its initial capital of 10 billion ecus (European Currency Units – about US$13 billion), can the bank meet the needs of a region which needs hundreds of billions of dollars to stand on its feet? Surprisingly, the bank's main problem is not a shortage of capital, but a shortage of feasible projects in which to invest.

"There are thousands of proposals arriving," said one director, "but most of them cannot be treated seriously. Most of the proposals say 'Please send me some money, I'll let you know what it is for later.'"

Other proposals don't meet the requirements of market realities. For instance, one proposal called for building a tunnel under the sea to link Siberia and Alaska for the purpose of "contributing to international friendship."

But the European Bank may have other problems. It is closely identified with Jacques Attali, not a darling of the press, especially in London. He is the odd man-out in the banking community, an intellectual who speaks six languages and is a fount of new ideas.

The Western banking establishment remembers well that as Mitterrand's special adviser, At-

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tali advocated the nationalization of 35 of France's largest banks and two major financial holding companies. Mitterrand was quoted as telling him, "You know, in fact, it is you who governs France. I trust nobody but you." Even though it may have been a joke, Attali's influence was no laughing matter for bankers. Today, the same Attali stresses privatization: times change and people change.

To be fair, the bank has not existed long enough to objectively review its performance. But this fact has not silenced the bank's critics.

The bank may face the same criticism that has been leveled at the IMF and the World Bank. But these criticisms are usually the familiar harangues wrapped up in populist slogans. The danger in Eastern Europe is that populist rhetoric could bolster incompetent or fearful politicians who are incapable of taking necessary and painful measures to improve their economies.

Attali understands the extent of the problem in Eastern Europe: "One should keep in mind that the communist system used to put socal equality ahead of economic efficiency. A new economic system governed only by market decisions would be an opposite extreme.

The role of the European Bank as the catalyst of a historical process is a favorite subject of bank executives. But the prospects for economic reform in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are still not clear. As Attali said in a speech in Oporto, Portugal, "God made the sea deep and perilous, yet it is in this in which the sky is reflected."

Marek Ostrowski
LONDON, UK

The shock therapy that is too shocking

For the first time in the IMF and the World Bank's history, a top executive said that they do not pay enough attention to the poor of the world. The surprising admission was made by none other than IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus.

Ostensibly, it is the poor countries (the 80 percent of the world's population which produces only 26 percent of global GDP) that the IMF and the World Bank should be helping. This constituency, comprising Latin America, Africa, and a large part of Asia, is actually the "fief" of the two institutions. The collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has revealed that their populations should also be classified as the underprivileged part of our world. In each region, the IMF and the Bank's actions have hindered growth as much as they have promoted it.

The problem of Latin America is simple. Given the high growth rate of population (over 2 percent a year), and the still higher growth rate of the labor force (about 3 percent a year), the GDP should increase by more than 3 percent annually, preferably 4 percent, to provide the cushion necessary to move the economy forward and improve living standards.

To that end, investment in new production units is required. Unfortunately, capital inflow fell sharply in the 1980s and the formation of domestic capital was hindered by the transfer of money from Latin America to US banks to service debts. In other words, foreign investments went down while net transfer of money abroad went up.

The standard prescription of the IMF in Latin American countries has been fiscal belt-tightening, anti-inflation crash programs, and sharp cuts in social security spending. All of these measures make life harder for working men and women, and the poor. More often than not, the IMF has pushed too hard for continued devaluations of national currencies in fragile economies with little supply response capacity.

Equally ill-advised have proven the IMF's suggestions to Eastern European governments to make the transition to a market economy in one sharp go. In Poland, the shock therapy so much hailed by the IMF and the Bank has led to massive unemployment and skyrocketing food and consumer item prices which have left those on fixed incomes in a bind. The first casualty of that economic strategy was ex-premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki in Poland, and the second was ex-premier Petre Roman in Romania whose government was toppled by the rampaging miners.

The African debt crisis is the worst. Africa's collective GNP has shrunk from US$200 billion in 1980 to $140 billion in 1990. As a consequence, malnutrition, hunger and infant mortality have reached alarming proportions while essential expenditures on education and health have been reduced sharply. African debt service has risen from 4 percent of GDP in 1982 to 8 percent in 1990. But these figures do not represent what the countries of the continent really owe.

If Africa could have met its scheduled obligations in 1990, debt service payments would have absorbed 15 percent of GDP and nearly 60 percent of the region's export earnings. Between 1986 and 1990, the IMF has extracted more than $3 billion from the low-income countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

Turning to Asia, a World Bank report on India's agriculture called on the government to halt the subsidization of farmers in regions that have prospered from state investment. The report claims that such subsidies are channeling cheap food to the urban rich. But what about the urban poor? Do they prefer food to be expensive?

Cutting state subsidies of food staples is also one of the central recommendations the IMF has made to East European governments. Predictably, the result has been a rapid increase in food prices. It is interesting to note that the state subsidies to support agriculture in Western countries amounts to nearly $100 billion annually. As the Romans used to say, *Quod licet Jovi non licet bovi* (What is permitted to Jupiter is not permitted to the ox).

At last year's meeting in Bangkok, the emphasis was on democratization as a prerequisite for getting financial help. However, democratization on the national level is not good enough as long as the world at large is beset by glaring economic inequalities. Let us hope that the remark of the IMF chairman in Bangkok will be followed by a critical reappraisal of all activities of the two world financial institutions.

Silviu Brucan
BUCHAREST, ROMANIA

EMIGRATION

Europe invaded

The expectations of a massive emigration from the former USSR have not come true. So far...

Yuri Kagramanov

The assumption that from 10 to 20 million people will emigrate from the former USSR in the near future has proved unrealistic. According to the estimations made by the experts of the former Union's Ministry of Economy, it is more likely that the annual emigration will be from one million to one and a half million people. A significant number of them will have to come back, having failed to find either a permanent or, at least, a temporary or seasonal job abroad. Such is the current situation.

And if we try to give a prognosis, in this case we will have to consider not only the economic situation, but also demographic tendencies in the regions in Western Europe and Northern America, where the main stream of emigrants will be heading.

And German will be a dead language...

In the majority of West European countries the birth rate has long sunk below the level required for the simple reproduction of the population. No better is the situation with ethnic groups of European origin in the USA and Canada. In some countries, especially in Germany, the reduction of population may assume a catastrophic character, because this process is coupled with a growth in the number of elderly, i.e., disabled people. And since the economy has its own laws of evolution and requires the replacement of the work force, a growth of immigration is inevitable. Who will immigrate?

Immigrants from non-European, mostly Moslem countries, prevail in Germany and France, accounting for the maximum number of foreign workers. Since the 1920s, immigrants have made up a large percentage of the French population, whereas the current range of employment of foreign workers is a relatively new phenomenon in Germany. First immigrants to France were mostly Europeans – Italians, Russians, Poles, who were rather easily assimilated, either in the first or second generation; their children, brought up in France, did not differ from the mass of the indigenous population. The present non-European immigrants are not so easily assimilated, if at all. The local population does not eagerly accept them; on the other hand, the immigrants themselves do not look forward to a rapprochement, preferring to preserve their ethnic and religious peculiarities. As a result, the number of foreign ethnic and religious enclaves grows, becoming a habitual element in the West European landscape.

They are not so large at present. But what about the future? According to some estimations, if the birth rate dynamics don't radically change, the number of Germans in Germany will diminish almost twice, while the share of people of Moslem origin may reach 30 percent of the country's popula-

1991. Albanian refugees at the Italian border

SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY

Prof. Boris Grushin's Vox Populi Poll



Sorry for the state, but we are leaving

How is the problem of emigration of Soviets to be solved:

(A) everyone must be granted full freedom to emigrate; (B) the right to emigrate must be restricted for some categories of the population, for instance, for skilled workers; (C) no one is to be allowed to emigrate (in percentage to the total).

The results of the poll show that serious changes have occurred in the popular mentality during the years of *perestroika*. Besides, they are demonstrative of the range of problems still unsolved and connected with the country's transition to a civilized society. Position B reflects not only the philistine tendency "to ban and restrict," but also the absolutely justified concern that the "brain and hand drain" will impoverish the country.

Upholding the complete ban on emigration are mostly collective farmers (15 percent of their total number) and pensioners (17 percent), while the full freedom of emigration is favoured by people with university diplomas (72 percent) and those below 24 years (77 percent), especially students (84 percent), and those engaged in science and cultural activities (69 percent) and cooperative employees (77 percent).

How great is the real danger of massive emigration so much talked of recently both in our country and abroad? The other question asked, "What is your attitude to the possibility of going abroad as a chance to make a good living?" addressed exclusively to young people of up to 30, yielded the following results: 9 percent of respondents said that they would like to leave the country and would do their utmost to leave; 36 percent said it would be nice, but the numerous obstacles discourage them from doing it, and 52 percent rejected this possibility altogether (3 percent of the pollees found it difficult to answer.)

The all-Russian public opinion poll was held last Autumn. 2,000 people polled.

tion. If this prognosis is correct, German will become an extinct language in the 22th century, and there will be more mosques than Christian churches in Frederick Barbarossa's motherland. France will present a similar picture. Britain will differ from its continental neighbours only in that there will be more Hindu temples there than mosques.

These forecasts were based on the situation of 1985-88. The anticipated emigration from the CIS may disprove this. Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians may well become more desirable immigrants to Western Europe, for they are closer (as compared with immigrants from Moslem countries) to West Europeans racially and culturally and are easier to assimilate.



Photo from Stern (Germany)

The situation in the USA is somewhat different – there exist large and steadily growing ethnic minorities there which are firmly rooted in the system, therefore there is nothing to impair their further growth.

It is true that currently a certain bias against our compatriots is emerging in the West, which, unfortunately, is not altogether ungrounded – Russians are not the same now as those who were expatriated by the revolution of 1917. Even Soviet immigrants of German descent, betrayed by their accent, are looked askance at there! Such is the situation today, when Europe isn't experiencing a real shortage in workforce. However, in another ten years it may be faced by the dilemma – either to curtail production or become more tolerant vis-à-vis foreign workers. It's more likely that they will choose the latter, and it's almost certain that they will prefer Russians to immigrants from Moslem countries.

Russian huguenots

The emigration from the former USSR could turn from an inconspicuous stream to a mighty flood under the following conditions:

First: if the birth rate dynamics in Western Europe does not radically change. However, even if this change so necessary for the survival of West European nations does take place, a shortage of workforce will be experienced for many decades to come.

The second condition: continuation of production and a high level of demand for workforce. There are no grounds to doubt either of these, at least in the near future.

The third condition: if poverty or the inability to find an application for one's skills forces more and more people to emigrate. Here everything will depend on how soon it will be possible to normalize our economy. However, even if we are going to witness our own "economic miracle," the gap bet-

This is how the Hamburg-based weekly *Stern* illustrates the flow of immigrants to advanced European countries. There are 2,600,000 legal immigrants in Great Britain (Indians, Pakistanis, immigrants from Caribbean countries), 880,000 (Turks, Surinamese and Moroccans) in the Netherlands, 900,000 (Turks, Italians, Moroccans) in Belgium, 3,600,000 (Portuguese, Algerians, Moroccans) in France, 408,000 (Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians) in Spain, 780,000 (Moroccans, Americans, Germans) in Italy, 482,000 (Yugoslavs, Turks) in Austria, 5,400,000 (Turks, Yugoslavs, Italians) in Germany, 456,000 (Finns, Yugoslavs, Iranians) in Sweden, and 160,000 (Turks, Norwegians, Britons) in Denmark

ween the levels of income in the CIS member states and West European countries will remain for some time, which means that there will be enough people who will prefer higher wages.

It is quite possible under such conditions that in another 30 or 40 years, millions-strong Russian communities will emerge in Germany, France and, possibly, in Britain, too. They will be smaller in other European countries.

Temporary emigration will probably be useful for the country. It will become a kind of valve capable of serving as an outlet for the dissatisfaction of the population – the unemployed and those who haven't found their path in life can try their luck in other climes. And those who will find a job and return home after some time will bring back, apart from money and know-how, also life experience, which may prove no less useful.

Leaving the country for permanent residence is a different matter. Here we will have to face a very complicated problem. For instance, the French still regret the expatriation of 100,000 huguenots in the 17th century who were mostly skilled artisans. However, Ireland furnishes the opposite example. Now its population is about 4 million people. 40 to 50 million Irish and their descendants live outside the country, which is not much regretted in Ireland.

What are they dreaming of in the line to the German Embassy in Moscow?
Photo by K. Isakov

A new Great Migration?

Probably, it is not so painful for a country when the excess of population is leaving it "for good." However, this is not our case. The demographic situation in Russia (even if the last two or three crisis years are discounted) does not allow us to encourage emigration. If millions of people leave the country, it will be so depopulated that it will, in turn, become the object of massive immigration from Asian countries. In this case we may witness a new great migration of peoples from East to West, this time a "peaceful" one.

The most grave consequences may be incurred by the "brain drain." Russia's future and its international repute depend largely on the ability of its people to update science and technology.

But we can't lock up the border once again! I would like to believe that the former notion of "patriotism," which pictured the motherland as a prison one could escape from only at the price of severence of all ties with one's people, is a thing of the past. But how can the outflow of population be compensated for? By encouraging a higher birth rate? According to current standards, the density of population in the European part of Russia is very low; the crowds we sometimes see is the result of the desolation of Russia's vast regions, especially in its northern and central European parts.

However, it is not so easy to reach a substantial growth in birth rate once the feeling of a secure life (which is more important than merely settled life) and confidence in one's future disappear. The mechanism begins to falter, and it's extremely difficult to restore its former stability.

People leave their long-occupied residences or, on the contrary, remain there, guided not only by material interests; their choice may be influenced by the feeling of having "roots" which does not allow them to leave their native land, or by their being carried away by the "stream of history" and their desire to be in the centre of events, etc. Today this country's daughters and sons regard Russia as an unkind stepmother, as a God-foresaken land deprived of the sunshine so generously pouring down on others. But who can say what the morrow will bring?

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

When in the 1970s a wide discussion on conservatism and liberalism began in the United States, its participants more than once noted the "conservative Odysseys" of those intellectuals who once took part in radical – Socialist or Marxist – circles to defect subsequently to the opposite camp, having publicly declared their confessions and new political creeds. John Dos Passos had his "conservative Odyssey," too.

Dos Passos' "infantile disorder" of leftism ended in the 1930s. Students of his life and works explain his socialist faith as a romantic adventure – socialism was for him a kind of "wonderful door" opening to a world of dreams, and his opposition to capitalism was explained by an impulse coming from traditional conservatism of the Edmund Burke or Benjamin Disraeli type. The uncertainty of this formulation testifies to the fact that the intellectual sources of Dos Passos' return to common sense are open to discussion. In fact, this impulse was provided by his coming in conflict with reality – and he bade his farewell to the phantom.

Even before the journey Dos Passos made to Spain during the Civil War he realized where the "wonderful door" of socialism really led to. By that time he had already been a hero of the "golden age" of American literature – a renowned novelist, playwright, historian and cultural scientist. Many of his novels were translated in the USSR, and in 1928 he visited Russia. From the very beginning of his trip to Spain he discovered that "the second Fifth Column of the NKVD" was active there. He had already known about the practices of this organization in the USSR. The political and economic experience of socialism was one more reason for his disappointment. Dos Passos also sharply criticized the post-war social experiments of Labour – the Engsoc, in Orwell's parlance...

Dos Passos became an indefatigable propagandist of freedom and democracy and an opponent of all their limitations, of any authoritarianism and totalitarianism. This aspect of Dos Passos' creative activity remains practically unknown in this country. This is the first publication of selected extracts of his writings and correspondence in this country.

Bidding farewell to the phantom

John Dos Passos (1896-1970)

This business about Kirov looks very, very bad to me. In fact it has completely destroyed my benefit-of-the-doubt attitude towards the Stalinists. It seems to be another convolution of the self-destructive tendency that began with the Trotski-Stalin row. From now on events in Russia have no more interest – except as a terrible example – for world socialism – if you take socialism to mean the educative or constructive tendency rather than politics. The thing has gone into its Napoleonic stage and the progressive tendencies in the Soviet Government have definitely gone under before the self-protective tendencies. The horrid law of human affairs by which any government must eventually become involved in power for itself, killing for the pleasure of it, self-perpetuation for its own sake, has gone into effect. *(From the correspondence, 1934.)*

In Spain I am sure that the introduction of GPU methods by the Communists did as much harm as their tank men, pilots and experienced military men did good. The trouble with an all-powerful secret police in the hands of fanatics, or of anybody, is that once it gets started there's no stopping it until it has corrupted the whole body politic – I'm afraid that that's what's happening in Russia. At the same time the great achievements of the revolution will be no more swept away by the Russian Terror than the achievements of the French Revolution were swept away by their Terror and by the Napoleonic period.

As far as this country goes, I feel more and more that the Communists are introducing the fascist mentality that has made Europe a nightmare (After all, it is the Bolsheviki that invented all of Hitler's and Mussolini's tricks –) and I'm very much afraid that it is the reactionaries that will profit by them. So I've come to think that the Communists in this country are a pestiferous nuisance – Stalinist and Trotskyite alike – and that for the time being the best thing people like us can do is keep out of their clutches. *(From the correspondence, 1938.)*

In 1936 the Spanish Civil War broke out. It seemed to me important at that time to preserve the Spanish Republic, not because of any sympathy for Communism but because of my anxiety about the success of Fascism. I endeavoured to assist the Republic and for that purpose in 1937 went to that part of Spain controlled by the Republican Government. My observations in Spain brought about my complete disillusionment with Communism and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government operated in Spain a series of "extra legal tribunals," more accurately described as murder gangs, who put to death without mercy all whom they could reach and who stood in the way of Communists. Subsequently they smeared their victims' reputations. *(Statement prepared for the House Un-American Activities Committee, 1953.)*

Not long ago I found myself talking to a pleasant and well-informed woman reporter in a newspaper office in a prosperous city in the Middlewestern corn belt. Although the region is usually chalked up as "black Republican" in politics, the paper she worked for wore a "liberal" complexion. I was trying to explain to her that socialism as I had seen it working last summer in Great Britain was not necessarily a force for progress. "But I thought you were a liberal," she kept saying almost tearfully, "and now you have turned reactionary." "The Socialists are the conservatives now," I told her, "and the Communists are the real reactionaries." But she remained unconvinced. The reason our conversation was so fruitless was that

she had decided that certain words like "liberal," "labour" and "rationing" had a virtuous connotation and there was no way of getting her to look directly at the events that lay behind the words.

The public mind in America that twenty years ago dismissed unheard anything that smacked of a socialistic notion is now receptive to socialistic notions. Partly this comes from a reasoned change of attitude brought about by the success of some of the socialistic measures of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, but partly it comes from the unthinking acceptance of the vocabulary of "liberal" propaganda that spread out in ripples from New Deal Washington, becoming vaguer and more confused and more destructive of clear thinking as the ideas that engendered it lost their vitality at the source. It is in this confused region of the popular mind that the Communists have been able to carry on their most successful propaganda operations. Thus it comes to pass that the "liberals" who think a man is defeated in argument when they call him a "reactionary" show very little curiosity about the actual functioning of socialistic going concerns. The "liberal" vocabulary that had some meaning in the Twenties has now become a definite hindrance to understanding events in the world of the Fifties.

Enough socialized systems and institutions have been going concerns over a long enough period of time for us at least to begin to get some idea of how they are working out. It's a most curious comment on the blindness induced by dogmatically held beliefs that in all the avalanches of print for and against socialism and free enterprise there's so little comparative examination of capitalist and socialist organizations; there's so little effort to try to discover how they work out for the men and women directly involved.

At home in America we have seen enough of the working of socialized enterprises, successful and unsuccessful, to begin to understand that from the point of view of the wellbeing of men and women, the contradiction is not between "capitalism" and "socialism" but between the sort of organization that stimulates growth and the sort that fastens on society the dead hand of bureaucratic routine or the suckers of sterile vested interests. The road must be kept open for experiment. By our habit of government we are committed to trying to keep a rough balance between the demands of different sections of the population. We haven't solved the problem of defending every man's freedom against domination by other men, but we have made a little bit of a beginning.

The rest of the world is becoming a museum of socialist failures. Our first problem now is to understand clearly the needs of our own society and its relationship to the shaky socialized regimes of Europe and to the regime of the law of the club that centers in the Soviet Union. To do this we must free our minds of the verbiage left over from the noble aspirations of socialist theory. Ideas, like everything else in the world become senile and decay.

As citizens of a self-governing society it is our first duty continually to be asking ourselves what it is we want from our institutions.

It seems likely, from what we hear faintly through the screen of lies that hems in the Soviet Union, that even there the illusions have lost their power in the face of the regime's failure to produce even the rudiments of decent living for its subjects. Even some Americans opposed to the Communists talk as if it were an excess of progressiveness and idealism that caused Russian socialism to fail. We find Frenchmen and Americans and Canadians, in all other respects apparently capable of sane and normal thinking, who are willing to turn their backs on the traditions they were brought up in and to give their allegiance to the Kremlin. The success of the aggressions of the Soviet state in the last few years rests in great part on the Kremlin's command over adherents and sympathizers in the outside world. Largely because the rest of the world has not understood it the Russian socialized state has been allowed to develop into a military force for pillage and conquest. Still the faith of many of our "liberals" in the Kremlin's idealistic aims has not faltered.

> A dream of the regime of justice will inevitably bring about terror

Those of us who believed in socialism in the radical twenties hoped it would promote self-government, expand individual liberty and make for wider distribution of the good things of life. It is obvious now that the Soviet Union is not the place to look for these things. Not even the American Communists really claim any of these achievements; what they say among themselves is that present miseries will be atoned for by the regime of justice and bliss that will be established once communism has completed the conquest of the world.

The Russians are barbarians, the Western Socialists will tell you; in England it will all be different.

How different is it? If you go around Great Britain asking questions of as many different kinds of people as possible, as I did last summer, you sense that in its ultimate implications British socialism is turning out to be not so very different from the Russian brand. Of course there's not the police terror of Stalin nor the Hitlerian pomp and parade through which the Kremlin daily expresses its power over the bodies and minds of men. There's not the proselytizing enthusiasm of a quasi-religious dogma that accompanies the agents and armies of expanding Russia. There's not the daily and visible and universal servitude; but neither has socialism brought any broadening of personal liberty. On the contrary: personal liberty in Great Britain has been contracted.

The very humane and well-intentioned people who are running the Labour government are the first to deplore the losses of liberty you bring to their attention. They reassure you with pious hopes that the "direction of labour" measure, which limits the individual's right to work where or when he likes, will be only a passing phase. Listening to these pious hopes, I couldn't help remembering similar reassurances from equally humane and well-intentioned Russian Communists who used to tell me, in the early days, that military communism was a passing phase which would disappear as soon as reactionary opposition was crushed. Thirty years have gone by, and military communism marches on to fresh massacres. A man has a right to ask the British Labour Party whether thirty years from now direction of

abour won't be the cornerstone of a new system of exploiation of the productive workers by a new ruling class.

If there is one thing that mankind should have learned from he agonies of the last four decades it is that it's never safe o do evil that good may come of it. The good gets lost and he evil goes on.

Government control of virtually the entire economy had aleady been instituted during the war. About all the Labour government has done is to amplify the wartime apparatus of ureaucratic management. The living standards of the workng people who were Labour's chief constituents had imroved during the war, and the Labour government has conlinued that improvement, particularly for the lowest-paid hird. Because there isn't enough to go around anyway, his has been done at the expense of the middle class, traditionally the nursery of British brains and initiative. Virtually everybody has been reduced by high taxes and high prices to the same level of subsistence. Incentive for effort and innovation has tended to disappear. A man is better off if he soldiers along in the shop and spends his Saturdays betting on the races than if he works his head off trying to rise in the world. The more his income rises, the more taxation will take his earnings away from him and the more he'll feel the dead weight of the bureaucratic tangle hampering his every move.

Bernard Baruch's remark, that socialism might not succeed in distributing wealth but would certainly distribute poverty, has never been better exemplified. Up to now socialism in Great Britain has accomplished very little more than to freeze the bankrupt capitalist economy at its point of collapse. Its bureaucratic machinery, operating along the lines of the machinery of bankrupt capitalism, has not been able to stimulate the sort of revolutionary initiative and thoroughgoing reorganization of the economy that might give the British people a chance to escape from their dilemma. Socialism has acted as a brake instead of as a stimulus to enterprise.

Man does not live by bread alone, the Socialists will tell you. The answer is that stronger than the urge to eat is the urge to exercise power over other men. In the past British institutions have done a moderately good job in curbing this deadliest of instincts, but in spite of political democracy British capitalism too often gave too much power to people whose only social gift was the knack of accumulating money. Now British socialism gives too much power to people whose only knack is getting themselves elected to offices in trade unions. At the same time the liberty of movement and the freedom of action that allowed people to escape from under the heel of the capitalist have been seriously weakened.

England has a new ruling class. Added to such remnants of the old ruling class as have remained in office through holding administrative jobs in government, industry and the civil service, is an infusion of new blood from the trade union leadership.

Under the cover of the dazzle of socialist illusions, and just at the moment when our technology is opening up the certainty of really widespread well-being in material things, the masses of mankind, under the rule of communist dictatorships, are being plunged back into a regime of servitude such as has not existed in the West since the days of serfdom. We can't go on forever blaming on war damage a situation that results from the fact that the socialized economies in France and England have not been able to produce. So far the socialized economies, instead of opening up new aspects of self-government and broader reaches of liberty for the individual, have backslid with dizzy speed into aboriginal oppressions. In the Soviet Union, failure to solve the problems of production at home has thrown Russian communism into a dangerous habit of aggression upon the rest of the world. As for Great Britain, we can hope that they will find a way to combine socialism with liberty, or at least that the failure of the socialized economy to provide its people with a decent life at home will produce a new explosion of British migration and colonization that will transmit to the future world of the West the valuable heritages of English culture. In America what we don't want to forget is that we won't have any Western world fit for a free man to live in unless we keep the avenues open for the freedom and growth of the individual man in the constantly proliferating hierarchical structure of modern industry.

> Watching the experiments of socialism, we are convinced that the rest of the world is becoming a museum of socialist failures

Socialism is not the answer to the too great concentration of power that is the curse of capitalism. We've got to do better than that. *(From the article "Failure of Marxism", 1947.)*

Comrade Khrushchev's tanks and machinegunfire may have been "stimulating" to the younger generation in Hungary but isn't it a rather drastic way to arouse people from feudalism? Certainly Hungary and Romania do seem to be working their way out of the Marxist jail. I shall await the details with a great deal of interest. It would be amusing if it turned out that the Eastern European countries were the first to recover from the spell of nineteenth century socialism. The fact that so much that is human has survived the massacres, the purges, the brainwashings is generally encouraging about the human race. *(From the correspondence, 1964).*

Compiled by Prof. Boris Gilenson,
Doctor of Philology

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AVIS

When the word "Karabakh" did not yet appear on the map of Azerbaijan, one of the principalities on the territory of ancient Armenia was ruled by the ancestors of 33-year-old philologist **Levon Melik-Shakhnazaryan**

Levon, who knows perfectly Azerbaijanian and Russian, worked as an instructor at the Tashkent college of education in Uzbekistan. He would have probably continued his quiet life were it not for the killing and looting of Armenians which began in his native city of Kirovabad (Azerbaijan) in the autumn of 1988.

Levon gave up his prestigious career and went to Nagorny Karabakh, where he headed a self-defence group which guarded the houses of Armenians, organized the evacuation of refugees and provided medical aid.

On December 14 of the same year he was arrested on the standard charge of "instigating ethnic discord." One more charge was added by the newspaper *Pravda*. Levon was accused by it of "hampering agricultural work" (in a large industrial city on New Year's eve!). The "case" was so fake that he was freed after spending a month in a solitary cell.

In February 1989, Melik-Shakhnazarjan took his wife and children from Tashkent and moved to Stepanakert, the administrative centre of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Soon he became an undesirable person for Baku representatives in the Karabakh government. Levon was put under house arrest and soon he was forced to go underground.

At the height of deportation of Armenians from Getashen, he penetrated into that village to see for himself what was going on there. Levon, still working underground, was included in a delegation of Nagorny Karabakh which went to Moscow in the hope of persuading the central government to stop the outrages committed in the autonomous region.

Having settled in Stepanakert, Levon first worked as a correspondent for the newspaper *Epokha* (Epoch) and then headed the local government's refugee department. At the first session of the Supreme Soviet of Nagorny

Karabakh (which had been proclaimed a republic) Melik-Shakhnazaryan was elected chairman of the commission for foreign relations.

* * *

Leonid Medvedko, 63, political scientist, military historian and a regular contributor to *New Times*, has undertaken a business venture risky for our time. Now that periodicals close one after another he founded a new magazine, *P&P* (Priorities and Prospects of National and International Security of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Political Science and Practice). The monthly appears in English and Russian, and it will also be published in French and Italian. The cost of one issue for foreigners is $10. For readers in the Commonwealth of Independent States the equivalent price in rubles is half as much, that is, around 600 rubles.

The general sponsor of P&P is the private company Alkarr and the publisher is the Medvedko-led Information-Analytical Centre which employs political scientists, economists, military experts, former intelligence officers and diplomats.

"We want to launch a campaign against incompetence in national security affairs both among the powers that be and among those who are striving for power," Medvedko says. Why is the magazine intended mainly for foreign and not domestic readers? "We are going through a period of deaf *glasnost*," Medevedko explains. "This happens during a quarrel in a family when people do not listen to each other. We are rather listening to what other people say about us. Perhaps in this roundabout way we shall hear the reasonable voice of our compatriots."

* * *

For a long time Soviet criminalists were not interested in the deciphering and classification of tattooes. **Arkady Bronnikov,** 66, retired police colonel and Candidate of Science (Law), is one of the few experts in this field. For 30 years he collected and deciphered intricate drawings which prisoners had tattooed on their bodies. He and his students (of the Perm branch of the Higher School of Law) visited corrective labour colonies and gathered "tattoo" information. About 18,000 convicts had been "examined" in this way.

Bronnikov brought a unique collection to a Moscow exhibition — 400 photographs of the most characteristic and widely used tattooes which unmistakably reveal the "hallmark" of their owners. For instance, a dagger is a mark of hoodlums. Thieves are marked

Psychiatrist – a guarantor of the Law

In the opinion of **Serge Bornstein,** president of the World Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology Association (WFPPA), "the sombre page of abuses in Soviet psychiatry has been turned over." However, he said, we are now going to another extreme, exposing all and everything. Incidentally, Bornstein noted, not a few diagnoses of the mental disorder in some Soviet dissidents have been confirmed in the West. True, this statement was fiercely refuted by a number of independent psychiatrists in Moscow.

Last year the WFPPA and the Serbsky Central Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, regarded in the past as the main instrument of Soviet punitive psychiatry, signed a treaty on joint activity. Serge Bornstein intends to promote cooperation by drawing our psychiatrists to work on a universal encyclopaedia of forensic psychiatry and exchanging students and specialists.

"The WFPPA unites practicioners working in their expertise," Bornstein explains. "Our aim is to improve legislation and ensure the social and legal protection of patients." Bornstein and his colleagues want to provide conditions under which psychiatrists, taking part in a trial as experts, could boldly express opposite views. For instance, in France the independence of psychiatric examination is ensured by the fact that doctors are paid by the court, not their masters.

The members of the WFPPA are going to frame a charter of the rights of mentally deranged people. In particular, it will also express the interests of mental patients kept in prison.

M. Levin

by a "thievish cross" and an octagonal star on the chest. Drug-addicts have a spider in its web and currency speculators the sign of the dollar tattooed on their skin. Tattooed finger-rings indicate the number of convictions.

In prison colony's offenders are often tattooed forcibly. One of them had "A slave of the CPSU" (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) pricked on his forehead and another had a mark put in this way on the inside of his lip. Many "art-lovers" draw pictures of famous painters on the backs of their inmates.

"The reading of tattooes helps to make a quick decision in a critical situation, not only by representatives of law-enforcement bodies but also by ordinary people when they are confronted with a criminal," Bronnikov explains.

Arkady Bronnikov has exposed several hundred crimes and published more than 40 works on criminal expertise as well as a dictionary of slang used in the criminal world.

A. Pyasetskaya

Carol Thatcher, 38-year-old daughter of Britain's former Prime Minister, and her mother are very much alike. True, unlike Margaret, Carol is not engaged in politics. However, like her mother, she is eager to make a career. In the ITV programme *The Truth About Women* Carol said she was not going to marry at all. The daughter of the British "iron lady" wants to devote her life to journalism.

Carol said she had a difficult childhood. Surrounded by nurses, she did not see her mother for several days running. The political star of Margaret Thatcher was only beginning to rise at the time, and she was too busy to pay attention to her daughter. When the girl went to school she was almost the only pupil whose mother worked. "What is she doing all day?" her girl friends asked with suspicion. The little Carol did not know what to say.

Carol Thatcher has therefore decided not to have children so that they would not share her sad experience.

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

A year ago, after a sharp conflict, **Yevgeny Kolobov,** 46, gave up the post of art director and chief conductor of the Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko Music Theatre in Moscow and founded the municipal theatre, New Opera. Now, after the "full house" premieres, he is in the centre of public attention again.

Kolobov was born in Leningrad and graduated from the Urals Conservatory. In 1981, after 12 years of work in the provincial opera and musical comedy theatre, he was invited to the famous Kirov Theatre in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). But six years later he left it, failing to bring his ideas to the judgement of the audience. No other theatre hurried to invite Kolobov and he got a job in the Leningrad Concert Organization. A year later he was invited to Moscow.

After the first productions by the chief conductor — Bellini's Il Pirate and Boris Godunov — the Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko Music Theatre, previously considered second-rate, became the talk of Moscow. No one noticed at first how the "old-timers," who thought Kolobov's demands to be exorbitant, began a real war against him, and they won. Kolobov left the theatre, renouncing his titles and party card. He was followed by about 200 people — singers, musicians and technical personnel — who later formed the backbone of the New Opera Theatre.

Kolobov does not tolerate hack work. This quality, combined with his lack of diplomatic flexibility, has contributed much to his reputation as a "dictator." He defends the primacy of the conductor in the opera production and even interferes in the score. To the horror of adherents of traditions, for instance, he can shift the overture from the beginning to the end of an opera. It is quite possible, however, that this self-will today makes Kolobov one of the most interesting personalities in Russia's musical world.

L. Dolgacheva

Her worth as an actress



Italian actress **Francesca Dellera,** tired of domestic critics and professional troubles at home, has decided to settle in Paris. After her successful playing in the films *Capriccio, Roba da ricchi, La Romana, La bugiarda* and *La carne* she turned down new proposals of Italian film-makers.

France appraised Francesca at her true worth. Such respectable periodicals as *Le Monde, Le Figaro, Paris-Match* and *Liberation* prominently featured her photographs and carried long articles about the actress. The photographs of the actress taken by famous Alberta Tiburzi were used for posters that can be seen on every corner in Paris.

The celebrated film director Roman Polanski spoke highly of her professional qualities while the organizers of exhibitions invite her to take part in fashion shows.

In France, Francesca signed a contract for playing in a film to be a screen version of Georges Simenon's novel *En cas de malheur.* Brigitte Bardot made her debut in the previous screen version of this novel. Co-starring in the new film will be Alain Delon.

Replying to journalists who asked Francesca what work she will continue with Italian film-makers, who made her a sex symbol in the late 1980s, she said: "It's a pity to disappoint them, of course, but the French offer me the possibility to show my worth as an actress."

In the parents' bed

Leonid Mlechin

There are crimes which shock even the worldly journalists. Such as fathers raping their daughters. Young crime columnists sound sincere in their indignation as they condemn such abuses: "We've gone to the dogs!"

It would be an overstatement, however, to say that our messed-up life, poverty and spiritual vacuum are along to blame for this heinous crime. Incest outdates our society, but our society tried not to mention it.

The son does not marry his mother

In remote antiquity, incest was not regarded as anything out of the ordinary. Even the closest relatives entered into sexual relations for the sake of procreation, of enlarging their tribe. After the human community had become large enough, it made the first concession to genetics. Incest was placed under taboo because even the ancients had noted that sexual intercourses between mothers and their sons and between brothers and sisters, often produced defective offspring incapable of further reproduction. Religion confirmed the taboo, calling incest a mortal sin.

Like other mortal sins, however, incest did not disappear. Children were sexually abused by drunken fathers not only in large peasant households where the adults and children slept side by side, but in well-to-do families as well. Family bedrooms closely guarded their secrets. Evidence given by a mere child was not regarded as sufficient grounds for instituting legal proceedings. Sometimes a family took the law in its own hands in order to avenge its outraged honour, but that was lynching, a crime as horrible as what it was supposed to be a retribution for. The readers of classical literature can easily imagine such a situation.

Rape – a crime which can always be investigated – is, however, just one form of sexual abuse parents may subject their children to.

Doctors are powerless

Experts in medical genetics know what to advise a man and wife who plan children but are related to some extent. A special inbreeding coefficient exists for assessing the degree of genetic risk. The would-be parents may find out whether their coming child is likely to suffer from a hereditary disease.

There is little doctors can do, though, about the situation where a child is in the hands of sexually perverted parents. Especially if the child in question is a mere baby who does not know what's going on.

Nobody seems interested in the sexual aspect of parent-children relations in a family. But incest does exist

American medical doctors and psychiatrists were the first to sound the alarm. Not that children are sexually abused in North America for the most part. The United States' varied system of child-protection institutions did not stop at making the shameful "family secrets" public.

American society took the first stories about parents molesting their children with distrust. After convincing evidence had been furnished to support them, it became clear that the sex-harrassed children were to be rescued somehow.

A loving mother may do irreparable damage to her child's mental health



Michael Jackson's sister and Marilyn Van Derbur, the former Miss America, accuse their fathers of molestation

Photos from Der Spiegel (Germany) and Time (USA)

'It can't happen here!"

Is this a widespread phenomenon? Few victims can disclose their experiences in public. Nevertheless, following a fifteen-year discussion of the subject in the press, thousands of adult and well-known Americans come up with stories on what their parents and other relatives did to them.

Until fifteen years ago incest was regarded as a rather rare phenomenon and restricted to cases of fathers and stepfathers molesting their growing daughters. This illusion is long gone. Now an estimated 200,000 acts of incest are committed in the USA a year. Investigations carried out in the states of California and Massachusetts in the past decade revealed lamentable statistics: one of every five girls and one of every seven boys aged under 18 had been molested by their parents at least on one occasion.

Does anything of the kind happen in Russia?

1979 was declared by the UN International Year of the Child. As we worked on a book about the position of children in the world, my co-author and myself put a number of questions to the USSR Ministry of Health, such as: what is known about the abuse of parental rights in our society? How many parents beat their children? What is known about using children as sex objects?

"None of this is the case in our country," was the Ministry's reply.

The Ministry officials did not lie to us. No one compiled any statistics on crimes committed by parents against their children. No statistics, no crimes?

Russia's few sexologists alone know that for quite a number of their patients problems began early in life when they fell victim to sex crimes.

Conspiracy of silence

Those who commit such crimes can easily get away with them. Children are told to keep mum. There are no eyewitnesses. No one can prove anything (except in cases of brutal rape). The police, tutors and doctors do not take children's complaints seriously, as a rule. "You are inventing things. You've seen too many bad movies," is the usual reaction to a child's story about the way he is treated at home.

That is why a special telephone service has been set up in the US: any child can dial a certain phone number and break the silence. The child will be heard out by an expert, which makes all the difference. Before he acts on the message, he has to satisfy himself that the child's complaints are neither a figment of the imagination, nor made with malicious intent. After incest had come in for public discussion, there arose the danger of some children trying to avenge themselves on a relative by implicating him (or her) in a filthy crime. The record of the past few years shows, however, that such cases are extremely rare. A child's story almost invariably proves true.

The meaning of the term "incest" has been broadened. Today psychiatrists apply it not only to the sex act proper (in all its forms, oral and anal contact included), but also any forms of petting and the deliberate touching of child's genitals. All this may have adverse effects on the child's psyche – and not only sex-related ones – and may lead to maladjustment later in life. Drug-addiction and alcoholism, short-lived marriages, dread of having children – such are the consequences of "innocent sex games"...

Children are sexually abused in unhappy families, especially when the parents part. In such cases, children are in danger of being molested not only by the alcoholic father, but by the depressive mother as well, if she sees her small boy or girl as a substitute for the man who has left her. She bathes together with the child, takes her/him to bed with her, and inspects her/his body thoroughly... She may not even be aware of her actions being dangerous to the unsuspecting child.

As a rule, sexually abused children become able to share their tragic experiences with others when they pass the age of thirty and feel confident enough.

The heirs to King Oedipus

Incest is not a problem reserved exclusively for law-enforcement agencies and child psychiatrists to deal with. The story of Oedipus, King of Thebes, who slew his father and married his mother is one of the most important ancient Greek myth. For all its numerous interpretations, the Oedipus complex remains to psychoanalysts a key to understanding their patients' sexual behaviour.

Sigmund Freud attached great importance to the Oedipus complex and presumed that between the ages of three to five a child develops libidinal feelings (subconscious, of course) towards the parent of the opposite sex. In Freud's view, the unresolved Oedipus complex persists into adult life and becomes a source for neuroses.

Over the past two decades, American social psychologists have been studying men and women's sexual fantasies in earnest. These studies, which seemed frivolous and unscientific at first, turned out to be most instrumental in understanding our contemporaries' sexual emotions. Over past decades, fantasies changed, reflecting emancipation and the evolution of relations between the sexes. The basic "motifs" remain the same, though: fantasies, dreams of sexual relations with the parents, brothers, sisters.

Although Sigmund Freud usually in-

sisted on the universality of the Oedipus complex, he meant the son-mother relations and denied the existence of the female equivalent of King Oedipus. He regarded his lady patients' near-hysterical stories about how they had been raped by their fathers, step-fathers and big brothers not as sexual fantasies but as a reflection of the woman's humiliated position in society and the family during his time. The head of the family, the master, was king, and no new man, be it a bridegroom, a lover or husband, could rival with him...

A Sunday morning with dad

Today women feel to be equal to men in every respect, but the father, the step-father, the big brother are still present in her sexual fantasies. These fantasies can be either happy, or tragic.

Tragic fantasies come mostly from the parents' dangerous sexual behaviour. Games with an undertone of sexuality, which seem quite innocent to them, may cause their children to develop neuroses in the long run. In the book *My Secret Garden*, the American sociologist Nancy Friday quotes a characteristic letter from a young woman. "My fantasies," the letter goes, "shock me so much that I have never dared share them with anyone... I have decided to write to you so as to try and get rid of them... My fantasies revolve around all forms of incest. If I want to like a man, I must imagine him to be a member of my family... I called the man I slept with "brother"... But my principal fantasies have always been about my father. I had a good home, receiving lots of affection from my parents, especially my father. He has, since I was about eight years old, been my fantasy lover during masturbation.

"I remember well how it all started. On Sundays I would bring in fresh newspapers and climb into my parents' bed. This particular Sunday morning my mother decided to get up and go to a nearby farmhouse for some fresh milk. Alone in bed with Dad, I had a wrestling match with him. He decided to let me win. When I straddled and sat on my father, I felt something... I rocked my bottom back and forward... Since that precise day I have always thought how nice it would be to do it with Dad... I cannot get rid of this fantasy, it is haunting me. I feel awfully ashamed, I can't discuss with anyone what's virtually killing me. Is there a cure for this?"

The habit of spending Sunday mornings in the parents' bed does not always end so tragically, of course, but the story goes to show how dangerous any hint of sex in parent-children relations may be.

"I was molested at the age of eight..."

Time magazine carried the story of a woman whose mother began to abuse her sexually since the age of three, with all the ensuing long-term consequences.

"I was isolated and lonely as a child... A teenager molested me when I was eight; by the time I was 18, I was pregnant. My mother opened the door, and everybody else walked through.

"I was keeping the secret about my mother's violation from myself... I had to acknowledge that the woman who gave me life also devalued it, demeaned it and nearly destroyed it... To block out the pain, I used alcohol... Recovery is not easy. The messages my mother filled me with had to be replaced with self-esteem... I promised my children I would break the cycle of incest that has haunted my family."

The League Against Molestation has been set up in the United States. Its members offer counselling to incest victims, most of whom cannot navigate the recovery process without professional help. They need group psychotherapy, which often takes two years. Two such victims lobbied their Washington State legislature to enact a new law which allows people even three years after the discovery of abuse to bring the case to court because many incest victims do not even realize their childhood experiences until they are well into adulthood.

The act of breaking the silence is crucial to recovery.

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